Chapter 9: The Israeli-Jewish Collective Memory of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian Conflict: A Suggested Model Verified by Survey Findings[44]

Dr. Rafi Nets-Zehngut

Prof. Daniel Bar-Tal

Abstract

Popular memory - one of the types of **collective** memory – consists of representations of the past, presented in coherent narratives, adopted by society members. **The study described in this chapter used a public survey to examine the popular memory of Israeli-Jews about the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict** ("conflict"). Specifically, it aimed to descriptively map for the first time the content of this memory and its index as well as to validate a process model that depicts the functioning of popular memory within a series of factors as antecedents, mediating factors and as outcomes. A representative sample of Israeli-Jews responded to a wide scope survey questionnaire that included quantitative evaluation of **23 major events/topics** ("topics") about the conflict ranging from the late nineteenth century to present times. For example**, these topics address** the quality of relations between the Zionist pioneers and the local Palestinians in the Land of Israel (Palestine), the causes for the eruption of various wars, the causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus and of the establishment of the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the sincerity of parties in peace negotiations and Israel's "purity of arms" in the battlefield. In addition, the survey questionnaire included four **general views of life** (e.g., values such as universalism) and four **views of the ingroup** (e.g., extent of identification with it) as antecedents. The independent factors also include various **socio-**

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demographic details (e.g., age and religiosity). Then the model moves to a narrower perspective of **mediating** factors which **are** directly related to the conflict, but only in a **general** manner. These are the general views of the conflict, which are termed the socio-psychological repertoire of the conflict (i.e., its ethos, emotions and **memory** – the focus of the model). Since the model focuses on the memory, another **mediating** factor is addressed: **people's openness to alternative/new information about the conflict**. Lastly, the model includes two **dependent variables** that are **specific views about the conflict**. One is in the direction of **resolving** the conflict (i.e., **support of compromises**) and the second is in the opposite direction, of **escalating** the conflict (**support for using military measures** against the rival).

The **descriptive** results show that the majority of the Israeli-Jews (about 60%) hold a Zionist narrative in their popular memory, one that is selective and biased, favoring their own group and delegitimizing the rival. However, it must be noted that this majority comprises those who hold the extreme Zionist narrative (1/4 of this majority) and those who support the moderate-Zionist narrative (3/4 of this majority). From another perspective – the index of the Israeli-Jewish popular memory of the conflict was found to be situated at point 2.4 on a 5-point scale, where 1 represents the extreme-Zionist narrative, 2= moderate-Zionist, 3 = critical/post-Zionist, while 4 and 5, respectively = the moderate and extreme-Palestinian narratives. The present study also confirmed the key role that popular memory plays in the repertoire of societies involved in intractable conflict. Popular memory serves as an important mediating factor that influences and is influenced by various psychological determinants. The **model-related** findings found interesting correlations between various factors as well as validating the aforementioned suggested model.

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1. Introduction

Collective memory is a general category that includes several main types of memories such as popular memory and official memory (Nets-Zehngut, 2012a). **Popular** memory consists of representations of the past, presented in coherent narratives, adopted by society members. It is presented personally orally by family members, friends, and other informal agents, as well as transmitted through contents of ceremonies, rituals, media or cultural products that the community produces. Popular memory serves as part of the contents of the collective identity of people and therefore it plays a central role in societal life (David and Bar-Tal, 2009). It serves as an illuminator of the past and present, as a guide to future collective action and as a mobilizing force of society members towards different societal goals. Popular memory is distinguished from **official** memory that consists of representations of the past, presented in coherent narratives, held and imparted by the formal institutions of the society such as schools, where it is presented in history textbooks. In some societies the content of the popular and the official memories, the historical narratives, can be similar and even identical and then these narratives are also imparted by formal channels and institutions of the society, such as schools or mass media. Children learn them at very early age and they are further maintained by various societal mechanisms.

Popular memory is of special importance in times of prolonged **conflicts** because it provides the narrative of their eruption, continuation, major events, and personalities involved. Typically, this memory is selective, biased and distortive because it tends to justify the in-group's goals in the conflict, dehumanize the enemy, and glorify the in-group (Bar-Tal, 2013; Paez and Liu, 2011). These narratives play a crucial role in the continuation of the conflict because they feed animosity, mistrust, hatred and fear that lead to violence. Specifically, these narratives negatively influence the psychological reactions of the members of the rival parties, and consequently, their behavior. In fact, they can be considered as part of the socio-psychological repertoire that serves as a barrier to peaceful resolution of the conflict (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011).

The maintenance of popular memory is a major determinant of various political and social processes. For example, in their popular memory, the Koreans continue to retain narratives about the atrocities conducted against them by the Japanese in World War II (e.g., chemical experiments on prisoners by unit 731 and use of Korean women as "comfort women" for the Japanese soldiers) and these narratives are major obstacles to the improvement of relations between Koreans and Japanese (Dower, 2014). Similar obstacles are found in the memories of the Chinese who do not forget the narrative of the 1937 massacre of Nanjing and thus have difficulty in developing friendly relations with the Japanese (Takashi, 2006). Similarly, the popular memory of the Palestinians about the 1948 Nakba (Arabic for "catastrophe") in which hundreds of thousands of them left Palestine (many were expelled by the Jews/Israelis) is one of the major focal events that prevents peace-making in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All the above cases indicate the importance of researching popular memory (Nets-Zehngut, 2014).

Acknowledging this importance, the last few decades have witnessed a "memory boom" – the topic of collective memory has gained major place in the academic, political and social spheres, and especially regarding bloody and lasting conflicts that rage across the world (Olick, Vinitzky-Seroussi and Levy, 2011). In academic research, for example, numerous studies (academic articles, book chapters and books) address the collective memories of conflicts (Radstone and Schwartz, 2010). They differ in cases, scope and methods. There are various methods to investigate the popular memory in general, and that of conflicts in particular. One of these is to conduct oral history projects in which scholars or activists interview individuals who have directly experienced conflicts. Examples include the oral history project of the Palestinian NGO **Palestine Remembered** (2017) that collects testimonies of Palestinians about the 1948 War, and the collection of testimonials of Holocaust survivors in the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin (Dekel, 2011). Other methods analyze the contents of newspaper articles, of television programs (e.g., in Spain regarding the Franco dictatorship; Davis, 2005), of schoolbooks (e.g., in Israel regarding the 1948 War; Nets-Zehngut, 2013a), of theatre shows, films, and of ceremonies in schools (Meyers, Neiger and Zandberg, 2011).

All these methods produce valuable information about the popular memory of a society and about (in our case) conflicts, but they have several major limitations. First, none of the methods allows for generalization from their

specific findings to the totality of society members because each of these methods addresses a limited number of people or products (e.g., films or publications) that are not representative of the entire society. Second, these methods do not enable statistical analysis in order to explore the correlation and causality between the memory as well as its determinants, and consequences (e.g., socio-demographics and various psychological characteristics).[45] And third, eliciting the historical narratives from products (e.g., newspaper articles, television programs, films and theatre shows) is an indirect manner of analysis. After all, these narratives are influenced by commercial, practical, and political considerations, and thus, such methodologies are bound to produce distorted findings.

The current study uses a public opinion survey to examine the popular memory of conflicts. This method enables bypassing all of the three limitations of the above methods. When a survey uses a **representative** sample (as in our case), it allows for generalization of the findings from the sample to the entire population; it enables statistical analysis in order to determine the causality between the memory and its determinants and consequences, and it elicits the narratives directly (thereby more accurately) from their holders – the people (Schuman and Rodgers, 2004 ;Volkmer, 2006). Acknowledging the advantages of this method, public opinion surveys have recently been used more frequently to research popular memory (see the literature review below), although this method is still peripheral in memory studies.

The study described in this chapter was conducted among Israeli-Jews ("Israelis"[46]) and examined their popular memory about 23 major events of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict (the "conflict"). The wide scope of the survey questionnaire (96 questions), the fact that it was conducted among a representative sample of Israelis, exploring their memories of the conflict for the first time, the centrality of the given conflict worldwide, and the extensive statistical analysis of the findings addressing the above shortcomings (including the first model of memory dynamics) – together highlight the empirical and theoretical contributions of this chapter. Moreover, although the chapter theoretically addresses the popular memory of **conflicts**, its contributions are also relevant to the popular memory of "political violence" at large. This term is

[45] While as an exception, oral history projects allow such statistical analysis, they largely actually never do it.
[46] Including "Israeli" society, popular memory, scholars, etc.

defined widely to include (aside from intra- and interstate conflicts) despotic regimes, genocide, colonialism, severe human rights abuses, and terrorism. Before turning to the report of the study, we would like to expand the discussion on collective memory, and primarily on one of its types, the relevant one for our chapter - the popular memory.

2. Collective/popular memory - Background

The eight main characteristics of popular memory.[47] First, as noted, this memory does not intend to provide an objective history of the past but tells about a past that is functional and relevant to the society's present existence and future aspirations. Thus, it provides socially constructed narratives that have some basis in actual events, but are biased, selective and distorted in ways that meets present societal needs (Bar-Tal, Oren and Nets-Zehngut, 2014). It is entrenched in the particular socio-political-cultural context that imprints its meaning. In this vein, Connerton (1989) points out that "our experience of the present very largely depends upon our knowledge of the past. We experience our present world in the context which is causally connected with the past event and objects" (p. 2; see also Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983; Liu and Hilton, 2005).

Second, the narratives adopted in the popular memory are shared by at least a large part of group members and are treated by many of them as truthful accounts of the past and a valid history of their group. These members hold the narratives in their repertoires, rely on them in constructing a political worldview, express them in intra-societal public discourse, as major arguments in intergroup debates, and use them as a rationale in justifying their line of action. The narratives, carried in minds or expressed in tangible products, are not of unitary nature because of individual differences that characterize human beings even when they hold the same narratives.

Third, popular memory serves as a foundation for experiencing shared emotions (e.g., Sen and Wagner, 2005). This means that the narratives elicit various emotions that society members carry as individuals and as a collective. These emotions are part of the collective emotional orientation and serve various societal functions. Thus, popular memory may raise fear because of past traumatic

[47] Many of these characteristics are also relevant to other types of memories, including official memory, but since popular memory is the focus of this chapter, we address these characteristics as they pertain to popular memory.

events, or anger because of remembered unjust acts carried out by other groups, or pride at a recollected victory and the heroic acts performed by group members. The emotions provide particular meaning to these events and facilitate their memorialization (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2001).

Fourth, popular memory with its events, heroes and myths, provides the foundations for the contents of various cultural products such as literature, films, plays, pictures and ceremonies. For example, national museums are filled with pictures that depict various past scenes addressed by popular memory and this holds true for national literature as well (e.g., Crane, 1997). In addition, the remembered past is integrated into daily life by commemoration of different events and heroes through place naming of cities, villages, or streets; constructing monuments; setting commemoration days; or organizing cultural or sport events to memorialize heroes or events.

Fifth, popular memory includes multilayer narratives since new major events or prolonged experiences are interpreted and understood on the basis of the held narratives of the previous events, even if they are unrelated, as long as this serves the needs and goals of the society. The new interpretation is then integrated into the narrative and serves as evidence for the justness of the group's memory.

Sixth, popular memory can be rigid, or dynamic and changeable. Through the years not only may it change its focuses, heroes, commemorated events or particular narratives, but it may also change its general outlook by changing its orientation. This depends very much on the political and cultural context in which new needs, goals, values or practices appear (Nets-Zehngut, 2012b). Such change is well illustrated in Poland with regard to remembering its Communist past.

Seventh, popular memory serves the political-societal and economic decisions on the societal level and is used to justify societal actions in the past, present, and those that are planned for the future. It serves as a kind of rationale for making policies and taking decisions by the authorities (Langenbacher, 2010). Moreover, the narratives of popular memory are used in the interest of power politics to justify particular policies, goals and lines of actions. They can be viewed as populist ideological contentions that persuade the masses to take a particular course of action – e.g., the Hindu-Muslim disputes in India (Sen, and Wagner, 2005) and the Balkan wars in the 1990s (Bar-Tal and Čehajić-Clancy, 2013).

Eight, finally, popular memory is perceived by group members as characterizing the collective in a unique, distinctive and exclusive way. It tells the particular narrative of the group's past and thus outlines the boundaries for group description and characterization. In this way, it makes a major contribution to the formation, maintenance and strengthening of the social identity of the group's members (Liu and Laszlo, 2007).

Popular and official memories are expressed in historical narratives that denote a social construction that coherently describes, and/or explains and/or justifies an event or issue based on a collective experience that preoccupies the collective, providing a sequential, systematic, and causal story that is relevant to the collective agenda, becomes embedded into the societal belief system and may represent collective identity. In every intractable conflict, the involved parties construct a conflict-supporting collective **master** narrative that focuses on the conflict at large. It explains the causes of the conflict, describes its nature, refers to major events, presents an image of the rival, characterizes the society's own representation, and attributes the opponent with major responsibility for the eruption of the conflict, its continuation and its violence (e.g., the French collective memory about the 1954-62 France-Algeria war as discussed in Macmaster, 2002). This master narrative provides a complete and meaningful picture of the conflict. In addition to this general master narrative about the conflict in its entirety, there are also more specific narratives that concern major events in the conflict, such as wars, and mini-narratives that refer to a specific incident such as a battle and even very specific events in a battle, or personalities involved in the conflict (Auerbach, 2010). Most of all, these narratives tell about extraordinary and exceptional events that have influence on the well-being of the society and many of them refer to violence. Violent events are core behaviors in intractable conflicts that greatly preoccupy the society members involved (Bar-Tal, 2003, 2007). Thus, the narratives of popular memory usually refer to wars, occupation, major battles, atrocities performed by the rival group, as well as the revered ingroup heroes who took an active part in the conflict, usually in a military role, and who performed courageous acts or were commanders in the violent confrontations. Out of the many events, Paez and Liu (2011) proposed that society maintains those narratives that fit dominant cultural values, that are relevant for current social issues, that enhance collective self-esteem, that are based on direct

and vivid experience of the society and that are supported by institutional and informal acts of remembering.

Of special importance are **major events**[48] that contribute determinative repertoire (ethos, memory and emotions) for social identity and provide the prism through which the present is judged (Nets-Zehngut, 2013b). Each society has major events that become symbolic events which are remembered by the group and commemorated. Groups encode important experiences, especially extensive suffering, in their popular memory, which can maintain a sense of injury and past injustice through generations. These events can be part of the ongoing intractable conflict or events unrelated to the conflict that took place in a distant past. In both cases, they provide the key evaluative measure which enables assessment of other events in the group history. But they always serve the needs and goals of the present and therefore their content and attributed meaning are in the service of the ongoing conflict. Still, they may change with time as the needs and goals change too (Nets-Zehngut, 2012b). The society eternalizes these events and keeps referring to them in public discourse, cultural products, ceremonies and commemorations. Moreover, these events constitute a major symbol in the educational system as the younger generation of group members are required to learn about them over and over again and grasp their significance for the group.

Particular contents of the narratives. In terms of particular contents, the narratives of the popular memory of an intractable conflict touch on at least **four important themes**. First, they justify the outbreak of the conflict and the course of its development. They outline the reasons for the supreme and existential importance of the conflicting goals, stressing that failure to achieve them may threaten the very existence of the group. In addition, they disregard the goals of the other side, describing them as unjustified and unreasonable. Second, these narratives delegitimize the opponent.[49] They describe the adversary's inhuman

[48] A major event is defined as an event of great importance occurring in a society; this event is experienced either directly (by participation) or indirectly (by watching, hearing or reading about it) by society members, causes wide resonance, has relevance for the well-being of society members and for the society as a whole, involves society members, occupies a central position in public discussion and the public agenda, and implies information that forces society members to reconsider, and often change, their held socio-psychological repertoire (Bar-Tal, 2013; Oren, 2005). A major event can be, for instance, a war, a specific battle, or a major atrocity.

[49] Delegitimization is defined as "categorization of a group, or groups, into extremely negative social categories that exclude it, or them, from the sphere of human groups that act within the limits of acceptable norms and/or

and immoral behavior through the course of the conflict and present him as intransigent, irrational, extreme and irreconcilable. Since societies involved in intractable conflicts view their own goals as justified and perceive themselves in a positive light, they attribute all responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation to the opponent (Bar-Tal, 1990; Bar-Tal and Hammack, 2012; Oren and Bar-Tal, 2007). Third, these narratives of intractable conflict present a positive glorifying image of the in-group (e.g., Baumeister and Hastings, 1997). They describe events that reflect well on the society and exhibit its positive characteristics. Fourth, these narratives present the ingroup as the sole victim of the conflict and of the opponent. This view is formed over a long period of violence as a result of the society's sufferings and losses (Bar-Tal, 2003).

Popular memory contains two **additional very specific themes**: A theme referring to violent confrontations with the rival and a theme that focuses on fallen members of the ingroup and especially the fighters, with an emphasis on heroes. These two themes are central components of the culture of conflict; they evolve as a result of the violence that is a very significant part of intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013).

Psychological needs addressed by popular memory. The narratives of popular memory satisfy basic psychological needs on individual and collective levels in the context of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013; Burton, 1996; Staub, 1999). First, these narratives provide a coherent and meaningful description of the past that allows comprehensive, coherent and meaningful understanding of the conflict for society members (Liu and Laszlo, 2007). As an epistemic basis, the narratives provide major rationalization and justification for present decisions and lines of actions. They explain why it is necessary to carry out violent acts against the enemy including immoral behavior, and why it is necessary to adhere to the original goals without compromises. They also play a role in satisfying the basic need for collective positive self-esteem. They focus on the positive features and acts of the ingroup, as well as differentiating between one's own group and the rival group, portraying it as evil and immoral. Popular memory also provides the basis for a sense of unity and solidarity, by emphasizing these themes.

values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserve maltreatment" (Bar-Tal and Hammack, 2012, p. 30).

Second, these narratives supply the motivational tool for mobilizing society members to be involved in the conflict because they outline a comprehensive rationale for the conflict. Of special importance is the need to mobilize society members who will be ready to sacrifice their lives on behalf of the group. This is essential for the continuation of the struggle which must be perceived as existential and just. The narratives outline the reasons for mobilization and portray heroes that serve as models for sacrifice.

After elaborating on the nature of popular memory, we turn to our case study; the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict and its Israeli popular memory.

3. The Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict and its memory in Israel

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict is a key part of the wider Israeli-Arab conflict and has lasted for about a century. It revolves around the territory that two national movements claim as their homeland: Jewish Zionism and Palestinian nationalism. Starting in 1948, the neighboring Arab countries also became involved in the conflict, although at present it remains mainly between Israel and the Palestinians (Morris, 1999; Tessler, 2009).[50] From the Israeli perspective, the conflict continuously poses serious danger to the existence of Israel and to its population (Arian 1995; Bar-Tal 2007a). However, since Egyptian President Anwar Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977, a gesture of goodwill that led to the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel in 1979, and for a long period until the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in 2000, hope also became a major force in Israeli society. Since 2000, with the eruption of the violent second Palestinian uprising, the Al Aqsa Intifada, the sense of threat has again become dominant among Israelis and hope has decreased. Since the early 2000s, there have also been several attempts to reinitiate the peace process, as, for example, in November 2007 during the Annapolis Summit and later, by President Obama and the Secretary of State John Kerry in 2013-2014, but all attempts have failed.

[50] The Israelis largely view the Arabs and the Palestinians in the context of the conflict in a similarly negative way, both as part of the same people (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005; Oren, 2009).

Since the foundation of the State of Israel in 1948, the narrative of the conflict that was almost exclusively adopted by Israelis was the Zionist[51] one. Largely, it was a typical narrative of conflict, biased in favor of the Israelis, portraying them very positively and the Arabs/Palestinians in a very negative way (Oren, Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2015), in part, an outcome of the wide self-censorship practiced in Israel at the time (Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin and Bar-Tal, 2015). Specifically, for example, this narrative blamed the Arabs/Palestinians for the outbreak of the conflict and for its continuation, and delegitimized them (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005). In contrast, the Jews/Israelis were portrayed positively as peace-loving and moral, and as the sole victims of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007b; Podeh, 2002). Since the late 1970s, though, a change has occurred in the Israeli approach to the history of the conflict. Members of various Israeli **societal** institutions have begun to present a critical narrative that contradicted the hegemonic one, at times termed "post-Zionist" (Nets-Zehngut, 2012a, 2014). This narrative mainly presented the Jews/Israelis and the Palestinians in a more balanced tone. Specifically, for example, the scholar Yehoshua Porat argued that the 1936-39 Palestinian uprising was directed mainly against the British and not against the Jews (Porat, 1976); and many academic studies (Nets-Zehngut, 2011, 2013c) and daily newspaper articles (Nets-Zehngut, 2012a), as well as some 1948 Jewish war veterans' memoirs (Nets-Zehngut, 2015a, 2017a), have begun claiming that, in 1948, some of the Palestinian refugees were expelled (in contrast to the Zionist narrative which has claimed that they all left willingly). This societal change intensified in the late 1980s with the beginning of a historical revisionist period commonly called the "New Historians" era (Nets-Zehngut, 2016a, 2017b). Additional new historical studies criticized previously challenged aspects of the Zionist narrative, and/or provided new evidence for the appearance of a new critical narrative (Nets-Zehngut, 2011). Since the late 1990s, and early 2000s, some of this revision has also occurred in **state** institutions such as the Ministry of Education (Nets-Zengut, 2013a), national TV and the State Archives (Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2014), although not in the publications of the Israeli

[51] Referring here to a narrative as "Zionist" does not mean that it addresses Zionist **ideology**, basically asserting the Land of Israel/Palestine as the home of the Jews. It is meant to address a **historical narrative** of the conflict which was prevalent among Israelis in the first decades after the establishment of the State of Israel (Caplan 2010). This is why the more critical narratives about the conflict are termed in Israel, inter alia, "post-Zionist" – since they emerged, or gained salience, only from the late 1980s.

army (Nets-Zehngut, 2015b) or those of the National Information Center (Nets-Zehngut, 2016b).

4. A model of popular memory

4.1. Overview

Our suggested model describes the way popular memory ("memory") of intractable conflicts[52] serves as an important mediating factor which influences and is influenced by various psychological determinants. It proposes a number of psychological elements that have interactive mutual influence, and thus it can be described as a **conceptual process model**. The model is applicable to both the individual and the collective levels of analysis because group members share beliefs, values, attitudes and emotions (Bar-Tal, 2000). Our description of the model will focus mainly on its parts that are relatively original, addressing only briefly parts which have already been discussed widely in the literature.

The model is constructed according to the **convergence principle** in addressing the psychological factors that interact with the memory. We start with broad factors that are **not** directly related to the conflict and gradually move to narrower factors which are more and more directly conflict related. Specifically, the model starts from a wide perspective with **independent** factors of worldviews which are not directly related to the conflict. Two types of such views are discussed: 1) **general views of life** (e.g., values such as universalism) and 2) **views of the ingroup** (e.g., extent of identification with it). The model also includes **independent socio-demographic** factors (again, **not** necessarily directly related to the conflict) such as age and religiosity. Then the model moves to a narrower perspective of **mediating** factors which *are* directly related to the conflict, but only in a general manner. These are general views of the conflict, which might also be called the socio-psychological repertoire of the conflict (i.e., its ethos, emotions and memory – the focus of the model). Moving forward, since we focus on memory, it is relevant to address another **mediating** factor: **people's openness to alternative/new information about the conflict**. Such information can present the history of the conflict differently than the way people see it. Therefore, such information can, for example, present the rival less negatively and this may

[52] Characterized as being long, violent, central to the parties and involving their members in profound ways as well as perceived by them as of zero-sum nature and irresolvable (Bar-Tal, 2013).

lead to a transformation of people's memory of the conflict. Lastly, the model reaches our **dependent variables**: **specific views about the conflict**. This category includes two important factors, one in the direction of **resolving** the conflict and the second in the opposite direction - of **escalating** it: 1) **support for compromises** with the rival, and 2) **support for using military measures** against it. Let us elaborate on each of the model factors.

4.2. Factors of the model

Many factors are used in our model and the next section will elaborate on them.

4.2.1. Independent factors I (not directly conflict-related) – Worldviews

This category includes factors that relate to two sub-categories of views: views of **life** and of the **ingroup (**in our case, the Israeli Jews). Although these two types of views are **not** related directly to a particular conflict, they still influence people's attitudes about it because of the wider perspective that they present. They influence the way rivals interpret the conflict and form their beliefs about it, about the rival, and about their own group (Dweck and Ehrlinger, 2006; Golec and Federico, 2004; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway, 2003; Maoz and Eidelson, 2007; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). Let us elaborate on these two types of views.

4.2.1.1 - General views about life

This sub-category consists of factors that address beliefs about various general aspects of the nature of the world, how it should be, and how people react to it. These are neither directly related to the conflict nor to the ingoup. Examples are general ideologies, such as authoritarianism and conservatism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981; Jost, 2006); values, such as universalism, altruism, conformism, traditionalism, accountability, accomplishment, cooperation and speaking the truth (Jugert and Duckitt, 2009; Schwartz, 1992); implicit theories about the rigidity or flexibility of human nature (Dweck, 1999); and the need for closure (Kruglanski, 2004). Some of these views support prejudice and delegitimization of the rival, boost ethnocentrism, reinforce xenophobia, sharpen the black and white picture, and thus support the adherence of society members to conflict-supporting beliefs. In contrast, other life views promote openness, reflective thinking, tolerance and acceptance of the other, and

thus promote peaceful resolution of the conflict (Dweck and Ehrlinger, 2006; Feldman and Stenner, 1997; Golec and Federico, 2004; Guimond et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2003; Kossowska, Bukowski and van Hiel, 2008).

From the many possible factors in this sub-category we have chosen **four factors** that have been found in studies to play a significant role in the way conflicts are perceived (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011). These four factors are divided into two sub-groups: 1) values – three factors of conformism, traditionalism and universalism; 2) implicit theories.

1) **Values** - Values are widely viewed as constituting the most central feature of a culture (Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 1997; Schwartz, 2007; Weber, 1958). They express conceptions of cultural ideals, and according to Schwartz (2007), values are beliefs about desirable goals, transcend specific actions and situations, and are prioritized by importance and behavior guidelines. We have selected a few pertinent values that seem to be relevant to our study, out of the list presented by Schwartz (2007)

1.a) C**onformism** - This value promotes actions that are in line with social expectations or norms, inhibiting inclinations to deviate from these norms that might disrupt group functioning and its system (e.g., Kohn and Schooler, 1983; Parsons, 1951). This value provides the basis for acting in line with the institutionalized supportive societal beliefs of conflict.

1.b) **Traditionalism** – This value cherishes respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas that represent society's shared experiences and fate. It symbolizes the group's solidarity, expresses its unique worth, and contributes to its survival (Durkheim, 1912/1954; Parsons, 1951).

1.c) U**niversalism** – This value is different than the above two. It focuses on the understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of the welfare of all people (not just the ingroup), as well as equality, social justice, broadmindedness, and world peace. It leads to the acceptance of others who are different (including rivals), their just treatment, and support for justice and peace. Relevant to the current model, studies show that while conformism leads to prejudice and the tendency to continue the conflict, universalism is related to relatively positive attitudes towards the other (Jugert and Duckitt, 2009; Sagiv and Schwartz, 1995; Schwartz, 2007).

2) **Implicit theories** – These theories address the way people form their ideas about the extent of malleability among individuals (Dweck, 1999) and groups

(Halperin et al., 2011). People differ in their approaches. Some hold "**entity theory**" which posits that group qualities are fixed and unchangeable, while others advance "**incremental theory**", suggesting that group qualities are malleable and can be developed. This distinction influences the way society members evaluate their rivals – which is typically negative. Thus, those holding the former theory view their rival as rigidly-permanently negative and as unable to change positively as required in peace processes. In contrast, those adopting incremental theory view their rivals as more flexible, possibly changing in a positive direction. Obviously, those holding incremental theory will thus have a more favorable attitude towards the rival (Dweck and Ehrlinger, 2006).

4.2.1.2 – Views of the Jewish people

This sub-category consists of factors that address beliefs about the collective he/she belongs to, his/her ingroup. There are many such beliefs; for example, the extent to which a person identifies with his/her collective (Roccas, Klar and Liviatan, 2006), patriotism (Sahar, 2008), and ethnocentrism (Bizumic et al., 2009), as well as how a person views past persecution of the ingroup by other nations (Bilali, 2012) and his/her ingroup's possible future persecution (Wohl, Squires, and Caouette, 2012). It also includes people's beliefs about the extent of their group cohesion, its homogeneity (Wilder, 1986), and its moral conduct (Skitka, Bauman and Sargis, 2005). Some of these beliefs support prejudice and delegitimization, as described above (Bar-Tal and Hammack, 2012), while others promote openness and reflective thinking (McCully, 2012). From the various factors addressing ingroup views, we have chosen four: Jewish ethnocentrism, identity, (past) siege mentality, and angst (fear of future extinction, as attempted during the Holocaust), considering that these are most relevant among Israeli-Jews in the context of the conflict:

1. **Ethnocentrism** – This refers to the tendency to attribute positive characteristics, values, norms, and behavior to the ingroup (Baumeister and Hastings, 1997; Sande et al., 1989). In the context of conflicts, this often refers to courage, heroism, or endurance, as well as to humaneness, morality, fairness, trustworthiness, and progress. These beliefs allow for a clear differentiation between the (positive) ingroup and its (negative) rivals, and they supply moral strength and a sense of superiority (Sande et al., 1989).

2. **Identity** – As Tajfel and Turner (1986) have shown, people have an inherent need to belong to a collective. They identify with their group and develop social identity (Roccas, Klar and Liviatan, 2006).

3. **Siege mentality** – This relates to the view that Jews throughout their history have been victims of anti-Semitism, including persecutions, libels, social taxation, restrictions, forced conversions, expulsions, pogroms, and the climax, the Holocaust (e.g., Ofer, 2003; Poliakov, 1974; Vollhardt, 2009). This notion is prevalent among Israelis (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Ofer, 2003; Poliakov, 1974; Vollhardt, 2009), and has been termed siege mentality (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992); it has had an immense effect on their view of the conflict and on how they act within it (Zertal, 2005). This view has been found to be related to the rejection of a peaceful resolution of the conflict via the two-state solution, and to be a major barrier to resolving the conflict peacefully (Schori, Klar and Roccas, 2009).

4. **Angst** – When people are highly concerned about the future vitality of their ingroup, they feel collective angst (Wohl, Squires and Caouette, 2012). Consequently, they can engage in protective actions for their ingroup (Wohl, Giguère, Branscombe and McVicar, 2011). In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israelis with high levels of collective angst have expressed unwillingness to negotiate with the Palestinians, or with even less likelihood, to cognitively unfreeze their negative opinion about the Palestinians and process alternative/new information regarding peaceful resolution of the conflict (Bar-Tal and Antebi 1992; Bar-Tal et al., 2009).

4.2.2. Independent factors II (not directly conflict-related) - Socio-demographics

There are many socio-demographic factors such as gender, age, education, family status, being born in the given country or an immigrant, religiosity, political attitude and income. From these, we actually focus on five factors in the model: extent of **religiosity, gender, political attitude, age and education**. Two of these factors (**religiosity and political attitude**) will be elaborated below because they have been found to be related to views about the conflict.

1. **Religiosity** – Israeli religious orientation moves on a continuum with ultra-orthodox and secular poles. Religious Israelis tend to be much more hawkish while secular Israelis more dovish (Peres, 1995). In addition, in comparison to secular Israelis, religious Israelis hold more negative stereotypes of Israeli-Palestinians, are less willing to conduct social relationships with them, and are

less willing to make territorial concessions in exchange for peace (Griffel, Eisikovits, Fishman and Grinstein-Weiss, 1997).

2. **Political attitude** – In Israel this orientation towards the conflict is assessed on the left–right continuum (Peleg, 1998). At one end of the spectrum are doves (also called "leftists" in Israel) who are more supportive of compromising with the Palestinians in order to reach a peace agreement. Generally speaking, they propagate a division of the land into two states (Israel and Palestine) with a return to the 1967 borders and a division of Jerusalem. They also tend to adhere less to the ethos of conflict and trust the Arabs/Palestinians more. At the other pole are hawks (also called "rightists") who are less supportive of compromises. Generally, they object to these compromises and advocate retaining the entire land for the Jewish people. The ethos of conflict is more prevalent among them and they are characterized by deep mistrust of Arabs/Palestinians (Halperin et al., 2008).

4.2.3. Mediating factors I (directly conflict-related) - General views about the conflict

During intractable conflicts the rival parties, as described, form a **socio-psychological repertoire** which includes three components: ethos, popular memory and collective emotional orientation ("emotions"), all pertaining to the conflict. This repertoire provides a prism, widely endorsed in times of conflicts, through which the members of the rival groups view and experience the conflict as directing their behavior (Bar-Tal, 2013). It is especially prevalent and has a strong grasp in a society during the harsh times of conflicts, due to the many conflict needs and challenges (Burton, 1996; Jost et al., 2003; Staub, 1999). This repertoire has been widely researched and found to have a major impact on the psychology of conflicts (Bar-Tal, 2013; Kelman, 2007; Kriesberg, 2007).

From the eight themes of conflict ethos, the many events/topics addressed in conflict memories and the various emotions arising during conflicts, we have examined three main ethos themes, 23 events/topics relevant to conflict memories, and four main emotions (all pertaining to Israeli Jews in the context of the conflict). Let us elaborate on these three components of the socio-psychological repertoire, that we term "general views about the conflict", and the particular aspects of these components that we have examined in the study.

1. Ethos – Ethos of conflict is defined as a configuration of central societal beliefs that provides a particular dominant orientation to a society experiencing intractable conflict. These beliefs revolve around eight themes that are typically biased in favor of the ingroup: a) delegitimization of the rival, b) victimization of the ingroup, c) positive portrayal of the ingroup, d) justness of its goals, e) the threats to the ingroup, as well as the f) importance of ingroup unity, g) and patriotism, and h) its yearning for peace (Bar-Tal, 2000, 2007b, 2013; Sharvit, 2008). As for the impact of the ethos, Medjedovic and Petrovic (2011), for example, found that Serbs who significantly adhered to the ethos, supported confrontational attitudes toward Kosovo and nationalistic political parties that hold uncompromising views on the conflict with Kosovo. Similar findings were observed among the Palestinians regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Gayer 2012) and the Israeli Jews regarding the Palestinians (Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv and Dgani-Hirsch, 2009).

From the eight themes of the ethos we have used three: delegitimization, victimhood and justness. seemingly most relevant and most powerful in their impact on people (Halperin et al., 2008; Maoz and McCauley, 2008; Schori, Klar and Roccas, 2009).

1.a - **Delegitimization** – This theme places the opponent "into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups considered to be acting within limits of acceptable norms and/or values" (Bar-Tal, 1989: 170; Bar-Tal, 1990; Bar-Tal and Hammack, 2012) in order to deny his humanity and provide psychological permit to harm him (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005; Holt and Silverstein, 1989; Rieber, 1991). Delegitimization describes an explicit, open, and normative process of categorization and differentiation that becomes institutionalized in conflicts. Specifically, delegitimization of Arabs, including Palestinians, has been widely practiced in Israeli society and has served as one of the major barriers to conducting peace processes (Bar-Tal and Teichman, 2005; Oren and Bar-Tal, 2007).

1.b **Victimhood** – This theme is rooted in the perception of a collective about "a perceived intentional harm with severe and lasting consequences inflicted on a collective by the rival in conflict, a harm that is viewed as undeserved, unjust, immoral and one that the group was not able to prevent" (Bar-Tal et al., 2009: 238). It leads to the reduction of feelings such as guilt and empathy, responsibility

and accountability among groups members towards their rivals (e.g. Cehajic and Brown, 2008; Wohl and Branscombe, 2008).

1.c **Justness** – This theme refers to the belief in the ingroup's goals in the conflict, indicating their crucial importance, and providing their rationales, as well as negating the goals of the rival (Bar-Tal, 2013). According to the theory of system justification, society members cannot accept conflict goals as random and unjustified. Research has found that the feeling of justness of the ingroup goals in a conflict serves as a major mobilizing force for its members to take part in the struggle and to use violence (Ginges and Atran, 2011).

2. **Popular memory** – This memory is formed, as described, around major events and topics (Nets-Zehngut, 2012b). Thus, from the many topics/events that comprise the Israeli memory of the conflict, we have chosen 23 major historical topics. These topics start from the late nineteenth century (with the arrival of the Jewish Zionist pioneers to Eretz-Israel[53]), to the early 2000s. They relate, for example, to the nature of the relations between Jews and Palestinians in the pre-state period, the causes for the eruption of various wars, and sincerity in peace negotiations.[54] In order to identify these major topics, we have used the findings of a study that examined which topics regarding the conflict Israelis see as central (Bar-Tal, Raviv and Abromovicz, in press). After identifying the central topics, a thorough examination was conducted in the literature, and expert opinion was consulted to ascertain the main narratives about these topics. Based on these two examinations, the questions of memory were constructed, consisting basically of one question per topic. The answers to each question comprise the various possible narratives about it. The narratives are situated on a spectrum where one pole comprises a typical narrative of conflict (highly in favor of Jews/Israelis and/or highly against Arabs/Palestinians), and the other pole is the reverse. The former narratives are termed "Zionist" and the latter, "Palestinian", and we also used a critical narrative in the middle ground between the two poles.[55]

[53] In Hebrew the "Land of Israel" is the Israeli term for the territory the Palestinians call "Palestine".

[54] See all 23 questions/topics in Appendix A, and in Appendix B, the results of the survey (i.e., what percentage of Israeli-Jews adopt which narrative per each topic).

[55] The use of the terms "Zionist" or "Palestinian" narratives does not necessarily mean that, regarding each topic that was examined, the narratives that were used were those that are actually presented by all Israelis and Palestinians. Each of the sides is heterogeneous and thus its members hold various narratives, with different distributions (e.g., more Israelis hold the Zionist narratives than those holding the Palestinian ones).

3. **Collective emotional orientation** – This orientation refers to the characterizing tendency of a society to feel particular negative emotions in conflict situations, for example, fear, anger, hatred and mistrust toward the rival or despair about the resolution of the conflict (Bar-Tal, 2007a, 2013). This orientation serves as a major barrier to conflict resolution, for example, by reducing support for compromises in peace negotiations, and increasing support for violent maneuvers against the rival, and its delegitimization (Halperin, 2008; Maoz and McCauley, 2005; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991; Staub, 2005). From the various emotions we examined four: fear, anger, hatred and despair.

3.a **Fear** - In the context of conflicts, fear has been found to cause great mistrust and delegitimization of the adversary (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway 2003), to be negatively correlated with support for peace processes and compromises (Arian, 1995; Bar-Tal, 2007a; Maoz and McCauley, 2005), and to serve as a barrier to conflict resolution (Scheff and Retzinger, 1991).

3.b A**nger** - Studies found a direct association between individual (Small, Lerner, and Fischhoff, 2006) and intergroup (Halperin, 2010) anger, and attribution of blame about the conflict to the rival. Angry people were also found to appraise a future military attack as less risky, thereby supporting it (Lerner and Keltner, 2001) and forecast more positive consequences of such an attack (Huddy, Feldman and Cassese, 2007).

3.c **Hatred** towards outgroups produces a clear distinction between the hated outgroup and the ingroup, and consequently delegitimizes the former (Halperin, 2008). It may also lead to the use of political and violent acts against the hated

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Here is an example of a topic and the narratives that were suggested to the interviewees to choose from: regarding the 1948 Palestinian exodus, the question was "What were the reasons for the departure of Palestinian refugees during the War of Independence?" Three answers/narratives were presented: 1) Zionist narrative - The refugees left due to fear and calls by leaders to leave; 2) Critical (post-Zionist) - The refugees left willingly due to fear and calls by leaders as well as expulsion by the Jews; and 3) Palestinian - The refugees were expelled by the Jews.

Regarding many of the topics, we used a 5-point spectrum, providing two narratives per each side: extreme Zionist and moderate Zionist as well as extreme Palestinian and moderate Palestinian (and the critical narrative in the middle).

The critical narrative deviates from the main narratives of both parties. For example, about the 1948 exodus: for the Israelis the critical narrative includes the cause of expulsion that the Zionist narrative does not cite (therefore also called "post-Zionist"), while for the Palestinians it includes the cause of willing flight that the Palestinian narrative does not cite (with no special term for such deviation from the Palestinian perspective).

outgroup (Watts, 1996), and to the establishment of extremist, racist parties (Mudde, 2005).

3.d **Despair** refers to feelings of helplessness and even hopelessness, as an opposite of hope, that greatly affect the attitude towards conflicts (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp and Gross, 2013).

In sum, these three components of the socio-psychological repertoire constantly interact and influence each other (Bar-Tal, 2013). For example, the relationship between the emotions and the conflict-supporting beliefs (that constitute the ethos and the memory) is the appraisal component of emotions (Lerner and Keltner, 2001; Lerner et al., 2003). Thus, for example, the emotional sentiment of fear that is related to the appraisal of the situation as threatening and to the appraisal of low control capabilities (Lazarus, 1991), will bring about a tendency to appraise actions in the same direction (Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal, 2006). In turn, this appraisal will reinforce existing victimhood and mistrust. Similarly, the emotional sentiment of hatred, that involves appraisals about the intentionality of the harm caused by the rival and its stable evil character (Halperin, 2008), amplifies extreme delegitimization, and enables initiation of extreme aggressive actions without damaging the positive self-image of the ingroup.

4.2.4. Mediating factor II (directly conflict-related) - Openness to alternative conflict information

The conflict-supporting beliefs that people hold are usually automatically activated when signals about the conflict become salient (Bargh, Chen and Burrows, 1996; Devine, 1989). In this process, conflict-supporting beliefs influence the way people process information about the conflict, motivating them to process this information in line with their **existing** conflict-supporting beliefs (Bar-Tal et al., 2009; Jost et. al., 2003). Kunda (1990), for example, suggests that such motivation may lead to biases in the cognitive process, specifically in strategies for accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs. Likewise, Iyengar and Ottati (1994) suggest that people selectively expose themselves to information and interpret it in order to confirm the beliefs that they already hold (similarly see Taber 2003; Hamilton, Sherman, and Ruvolo 1990; Maoz et al., 2002). Consistent-with-existing-ideology information also receives more attention and is better remembered (Macrae, Milne and Bodenhausen, 1994; Stangor and McMillan, 1992), and it is also more sought for (Schultz-Hardt et al.,

2000). Moreover, ambiguous information is typically construed in line with the conflict-supporting beliefs (Von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa and Vergas, 1995).[56]

As described, the three components of the socio-psychological repertoire typically hold conflict-supportive content, and as noted, people usually process information in a biased manner that supports their held views. This leads to the conclusion that it is difficult for people to make their repertoire less conflict-supportive, and more peace-supportive. And indeed, for example, Israelis with high levels of ethos of conflict tend to perceive photos depicting encounters between Palestinians and Israelis differently than those with low levels of ethos of conflict; the former perceive them more negatively than the latter (Bar-Tal et al., 2009). Thus, the more people are open to alternative-contradicting information about the conflict that might change their repertoire, the greater the chances that they will be able to adopt peace-supportive and peace promoting views (Halperin and Bar-Tal, 2011).

4.2.5. Dependent factors (directly conflict-related) - Specific views about the conflict

Eventually we would like to predict specific behaviors or their intentions related to the conflict. In this study we have examined two types of behavior/intentions: **readiness to make compromises as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians** (hereafter "compromises") or **readiness to launch military operations against them** (hereafter “military measures”). The first factor refers to a peaceful gesture and the second is, in contrast, a hostile measure.

4.3. Concluding remarks about the suggested model

The model proposes that the memory of the conflict is influenced by many socio-psychological factors. It is affected by **preceding** non-conflict related phenomena (worldviews of two types and socio-demographics) and by **parallel** conflict-related phenomena (ethos and emotions). These factors also influence each other.

[56] We recognize that information processing is also amplified by universal cognitive and motivational biases that characterize all human beings in general, in every context. Among these are cognitive heuristics, automatic cognitive processing, and various motivations such as ego-enhancement (e.g., Jarymowicz, 2008; Kunda, 1990; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Discussion of these is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Table 1 – The Factors Actually Used in the Model

No.	Independent Factors	Mediating Factors	Dependent Factors
	Independent Factors I (Not Directly Conflict-Related) – Worldviews	**Mediating Factors I (Directly Conflict-Related) - *General* Views about the Conflict (=Psychological Repertoire)**	**Dependent Factors (Directly Conflict-Related) - *Specific* Views about the Conflict**
	I.1 General Views about Life		
1	Value - Conformism	Ethos of conflict	Readiness to make compromises as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians ("supporting compromises")
2	Value - Traditionalism	Popular memory of conflict	Readiness to launch military operations against the Palestinians ("supporting military measures")
3	Value - Universalism	Collective emotional orientation of conflict	
4	Implicit theories		
		Mediating Factor II (Directly Conflict-Related) – Information	
		Openness to alternative conflict information	
	I.2 Views of the Jewish People		
5	Ethnocentrism		
6	Identity		
7	Siege mentality		
8	Angst		
	Independent Factors II (Not Directly Conflict-Related) - Socio-Demographics		
9	Religiosity		
10	Gender		
11	Political attitudes		
12	Age		
13	Education		

The impact of all of the above factors, via the mediation of openness to alternative conflict information, predicts the specific approaches to the termination of the conflict; the above are our hypotheses. Figure 1 in Appendix C illustrates the **possible** components of the model and its structure, while Table 1 above assembles the factors that we eventually **actually** decided to examine in our survey out of the many possible ones.

We decided to examine the validity of the model, and other characteristics of popular memory, using as a case study the Israeli popular memory of the conflict. Let us provide a short background of this case study.

5. Present study

5.1. Overview

The main goal of the study was to empirically validate the suggested model. On the basis of the suggested model we assumed that the general approaches to the conflict and the extent of openness to alternative information about it would mediate the effects of the independent factors of worldviews and socio-demographics on the independent factors: peace compromises or using military measures. We also assumed that the three components of the general approaches to the conflict (ethos, memory and emotions) influence one another. Recognizing that it is impossible to include all the factors that should potentially appear in the model, we selected only several factors that seemed most relevant and important from each category. The questionnaire that we used addressed all the components of the suggested model.

5.2. Method

5.2.1. Population

During August and September of 2008, a nationwide survey was conducted among Israeli-Jews by an Israeli experienced and computerized survey institute (Dialogue). A random sampling within stratified subgroups was used to obtain a representative sample. The people who conducted the interviews were trained interviewers in telephone survey methodology and they conducted them in the

interviewees' native language of Hebrew or Russian.[57] Questionnaires were translated into Russian and carefully back translated, for interviewees speaking Russian. At the onset of each interview, oral informed consent was obtained from the interviewee. The order of the questions throughout the entire questionnaire was counterbalanced, and there was no effect of order.

The final interviewed sample included 500 people (246 men, 254 women) who agreed to participate, yielding a final cooperation rate of 50%. The mean age of the interviewees was 45.5 years (SD = 16.49). Politically, 41% of the interviewees defined themselves as rightists, 29.2% as centrists, and 18% as leftists (11.8% did not answer this question). Of the interviewees, 31.6% estimated their family income as below the average in Israel, 25.7% the average, and 42.6% above the average. All in all, the distribution of the main socio-demographic factors in the sample represented that of the Israeli-Jewish adult population in 2008.

5.2.2. Questionnaire: Overview

We used a structured questionnaire which was completed by most interviewees in approximately 25 minutes. It included three main parts: psychological characteristics, socio-demographics and memory.

The **psychological characteristics** section addressed the interviewees' **general worldviews** (about life and about the Jewish people – **independent** factors), two of their **general approaches to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict** (ethos and collective emotional orientation – mediating factors), **openness to alternative information about the conflict** (another **mediating** factor)**,** and **specific approaches to the conflict** (support for compromise with the Palestinians and for using military measures against them – *dependent* factors). The distinctiveness of all scales was confirmed, based on both exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis operations.[58]

The **socio-demographic** part (**independent** factors) addressed the interviewees' gender, age, education, family status, being Israeli-born or an

[57] In 2008 there were in Israel approximately 1.2 million (16% of the total population) new immigrants from the former Soviet Union, many of whom speak Russian. "New," because they came to Israel after 1989, in contrast to Jews who immigrated to Israel from the former Soviet Union earlier, mostly in the 1970s.

[58] The presentation of all these analyses is beyond the scope of the current chapter, but all data are available upon request from the first author.

immigrant to Israel (before and after 1989[59]), religiosity, political attitude, and income.

The third and last part of the questionnaire, **popular memory** (another **mediating** factor)**,** addressed 23 major topics. Typically, using multiple choice questions, it presented interviewees with five narratives per each topic/question to choose from. This was based on the three main narratives (Zionist, Critical and Palestinian) with some variations regarding a given topic: (1) **Extreme-Zionist** – a narrative which describes the Jews/Israel highly positively and/or the Arabs/Palestinians highly negatively; (2) **Moderate Zionist** – a narrative which describes the Jews/Israel fairly positively and/or the Arabs/Palestinians fairly negatively; (3) **Critical** – a narrative which presents both parties in the same manner; (4) **Moderate-Palestinian** – a narrative which describes the Arabs/Palestinians fairly positively and/or the Jews/Israel fairly negatively; (5) **Extreme Palestinian** – a narrative which describes the Arabs/Palestinians highly positively and/or the Jews/Israel highly negatively. The two Zionist narratives and the two Palestinian narratives are mirror images of each other. In a minority of the questions, a three-narrative spectrum was used: Extreme-Moderate-Zionist, Critical, and Extreme-Moderate-Palestinian.[60] The questions and their possible answers/narratives used relatively simple language and were as short as possible. Prior to the survey, the questions were sent for review to several experts in conflict history and in survey methods. Moreover, before conducting the survey, a face-to-face interview pilot regarding the memory section was conducted with 15 individuals and it yielded positive outcomes and valuable feedback.

5.2.3. Measures of the examined factors

In general, regarding all measures presented below, the interviewees were asked to indicate to what extent (1: not at all, 6: very much) they endorsed the suggested assertions. Only regarding the demographics and the memory questions were other measures used, as described below.

5.2.3.1. Independent factors I – World views

In this category we examined eight factors of worldviews.

[59] After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, there was a massive wave of FSU immigration to Israel of some one million people.

[60] For example, the Jews/Israel were portrayed between highly positive and fairly positive.

The first four factors address **general views about life**: three factors of values and one that addresses belief about groups (implicit theories). The three values are based on the work of Schwartz (2007, 2010; Schwartz and Boehnke, 2004) and we used items from his original scale.

1) **Conformism** was assessed by three items (e.g., "It is important for him/her always to behave properly; he/she wants to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong"). The internal reliability of the scale was a = .52, and higher scores indicated higher levels of conformism.

2) **Traditionalism** was assessed by three-items (e.g., "Religious beliefs are important to him/her; he/she tries hard to do what his/her religion requires"). The internal reliability of the scale was a = .62, and higher scores indicated higher levels of traditionalism.

3) **Universalism** consisted of the four key values of universalism – equality, social justice, broadmindedness, and a world at peace. The items were formulated in terms of one's beliefs (e.g., "He/she thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally; he/she believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life"). Internal reliability was a = .65, and higher scores indicated higher levels of universalism.

4) **Implicit theories** about groups were measured using a four-item scale following the work of Rydell et al. (2007). The scale consisted of two items about groups in general adapted from Plaks et al. (2001) (e.g., "Groups cannot really change their basic characteristics") and two more specific items that focused on the unique context of intergroup conflict (e.g., "Groups that are characterized by extreme and violent tendencies will never change their ways") (see also Halperin et al., 2011). Internal reliability of the scale was a = .77, and higher scores indicated higher levels of the **entity theory** approach (i.e., a rigid character).

Moving to the four factors that address **views of the Jewish people**, we used the following measures:

5) Ethnocentrism was assessed using one item based on the work of Bar-Tal and Antebi (1992) "To what extent do you agree with the assertion that the Jews are the 'chosen people'?" Higher scores indicated higher levels of ethnocentrism.

6) Identity was assessed using a two-item scale (e.g., "To what extent do you feel 'Jewish'"). The internal reliability of the scale was a = .66, and higher scores indicated higher levels of Jewish identity.

7) **Siege mentality** was assessed using one item based on the conceptual and empirical work by Bar-Tal and his colleagues (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992; Bar-Tal et al., 2009): "The history of the Jewish people is characterized by continuous existential threat – the whole the world is against us". Higher scores indicated higher levels of feelings of siege mentality.

8) **Angst** was assessed using one item, based on the conceptual and empirical work of Bar-Tal and his colleagues (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992; Bar-Tal et al., 2009): "The Holocaust is not a one-time event, and it can happen again if we do not protect ourselves well." Higher scores indicated higher levels of angst.

5.2.3.2. Independent factors II – Socio-demographics

As noted, we used five such factors: **religiosity** (1 = very religious [ultra orthodox], 2 = religious, 3 = traditional-religious, 4 = traditional, 5 = secular), **gender**, **political attitude** (1 = extreme right/hawkish, 7 = extreme left/dovish), **age** (in years) and **education** (1 = less than high-school, 2 = full high school, 3 = post-high school [non-university/college and university/college student], 4 = university/college degree).

5.2.3.3. Mediating factors I – General views about the conflict

The three components of the psychological repertoire of the conflict were addressed here.

1. **Ethos** was assessed using a five-item scale which addresses three of the major themes of the Israeli ethos of conflict: Delegitimization, Victimhood and Justness.

1.A. **Delegitimization** of Arabs/Palestinians was addressed based on the work of Halperin et al. (2008), Bar-Tal and Teichman (2005) and Oren and Bar-Tal (2007) and was composed of negative stereotypes that are frequently attributed by Israelis to Arabs/Palestinians. The three items used to this end express negative stereotypization and complete mistrust of Arabs/Palestinians (e.g., "Unreliability has always characterized Arabs and the Palestinians" or "Arabs and Palestinians do not really care for human lives").

1.B. **Victimhood** was addressed based on the conceptual and empirical work by Bar-Tal and his colleagues (Bar-Tal and Antebi, 1992; Bar-Tal et al., 2009), as well as Schori, Klar and Roccas (2009). The one item used here expresses victimhood: "Throughout the conflict Israel has been the victim and the Arabs and the Palestinians have been the perpetrators."

1.C. **Justness** was addressed based on the work of Bar-Tal (2007). The one item used here addressed the historical right of the Jews for the land in dispute: "The exclusive right of the Jews to Eretz Israel is based on the fact that it is their historical homeland." Internal reliability of the five-item ethos scale was a = .81, and higher scores indicated higher levels of ethos.

2. P**opular memory** was assessed using a 23-item scale, using all the 23 memory questions (see all of them in Appendix A), most with the five-narrative spectrum and some with the three-narrative spectrum. In order to standardize all questions, we conducted a z-score process. The internal reliability of the scale was a = .81, and higher scores indicated memory which is closer on the spectrum to the Palestinian narrative, one that is more critical/post-Zionist oriented.

3. **Collective emotional orientation** was assessed using a four-item scale following the work of Maoz and McCauley (2005). The scale items addressed the extent of several negative emotions felt towards Arabs/Palestinians (hatred, fear and anger), as well as despair (of resolving the conflict). For example, "In general, when you think about the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and about Arabs in general, to what extent do you feel towards them: hatred? fear? anger?" Internal reliability of the four-item scale was a = .71, and higher scores indicated higher levels of these feelings.

5.2.3.4. Mediating factor II – Openness to alternative conflict information

This factor was measured using a new five-item scale created especially for the purposes of this study. The aim was to assess the interviewees' willingness to be exposed to information about the conflict delivered by non-Israeli sources. Such information could potentially contradict people's current views and knowledge about the conflict. The **sources** of such information that were addressed in the questionnaire were diverse. Three items addressed **Arab/Palestinian sources** such as newspaper articles, films, books and individuals (e.g., "To what extent would you like to watch movies or read books that present the Arab and the Palestinian perspective on the conflict?"). One additional item addressed **foreign media** as the information source (i.e., "To what extent during and after significant events of the conflict … do you also look for information on foreign Internet websites, T.V. channels and newspapers?"). The fifth and last source was **people with different views** about the conflict: "To what extent do you talk about conflict related issues with people who hold different opinions than you about the

conflict?". The internal reliability of the scale was a = .72, and higher scores indicated higher levels of openness.

5.2.3.5. Dependent factors – Support for compromises and military measures

The first of the two dependent factors is **support for compromises with the Palestinians**. It was assessed using a three-item scale, each representing potential Israeli compromise regarding one key issue in the negotiations with the Palestinians. The compromises that were addressed were: territorial compromise, based on the 1967 border with some land swapping; the status of Jerusalem, giving up some of its areas; and the Palestinian refugees - paying reparations and acknowledging their right or return, but with no actual return into Israel. The internal reliability of the scale was a = .75, and higher scores indicated higher willingness to compromise.

The second dependent factor (**readiness to launch military measures against the Palestinians)** was assessed using a two-item scale prepared especially for this study. It examined the extent of support for "[a] wide IDF military operation in the Gaza Strip to be carried out before Palestinian terror attacks are committed," and "the use of severe military measures (such as expulsion or bombing) against Palestinians, even if innocent people are hurt." The internal reliability of the scale was a = .74, and higher scores indicated higher support for the use of such measures.

6. Results

The following description of the results is divided into four. First, descriptive findings will be addressed, meaning, the content of Israeli-Jewish popular memory of the conflict (what percentage of the population adopts a certain narrative about a given topic).[61] The second section will describe the bivariate correlations of the research factors, the third will assess the validity of the initial theoretical model and the fourth and final part will examine the validity of alternative models.

[61] Based on the translation into English of the relevant part in Nets-Zehngut and Bar-Tal, 2016. In that 2016 article, reference was made on a **five**-point spectrum to **Zionist** and **somewhat Zionist** narratives (and the same regarding the Palestinian narratives), while in this chapter we refer to a slightly different terms, respectively: **extreme and moderate Zionist**/Palestinian narratives.

6.1. Descriptive findings – The narratives that the public adopts

As for the **general** state of the Israeli-Jewish popular memory of the conflict - based on the average of the following descriptive results regarding the 23 topics, we were able to calculate the **index of that memory**. On a scale of 1 to 5 – where 1 represents the extreme Zionist narrative, 2 = moderate Zionist, 3 the balanced one, 4 = moderate Palestinian and 5 = extreme Palestinian one, the index was found to be situated at **point 2.4**. That is to say, the index was situated between the moderate Zionist narrative and the balanced narrative, closer to the latter.

Let us now turn to describe the **specific** findings regarding some of the 23 topics; in other words – what was the popular memory regarding each of these topics? The results regarding all the 23 topics (i.e., what percentage of the Israeli-Jews adopt which narrative per each topic) are presented in Appendix B of this chapter. The following will exemplify the results by describing them regarding 10 of the major topics (marked with an asterisk in Appendix B), **starting with five examples that demonstrate a relatively low level of respondents holding self-serving Zionist narratives.**

Question 1 addressed the **distribution of responsibility between the Jews and the Arabs (including the Palestinians) for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation**. The findings, on a 3-point spectrum: 43.3% responded (i.e., held the narrative) that the Arabs and the Palestinians are primarily responsible for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation. This narrative is largely **Zionist** since it portrays the Jews/Israel positively and the Arabs/Palestinians negatively. However, 46% held the **balanced** narrative that claims that both rival parties are more or less equally responsible, while 4.2% held the largely **Palestinian** narrative (that the Jews are primarily responsible) (6.4% did not respond to this question). The Zionist narrative is in the minority, since 50.2% of the Jewish respondents held narratives that mostly portray both parties equally responsible while a small percentage view the Jews as responsible. This is a major discovery since it allows for a bird's eye view of the conflict and surprisingly the results did not express dominance of the Zionist narrative.

Another question (3) addressed the **quality of the relations between the Jews and the Palestinians in the Land of Israel in the years preceding the arrival**

of the Zionist pioneers in the late nineteenth century. The findings: 6.6% held an extreme Zionist narrative (perceiving the relations between the two groups as very bad[62]), 16.8% held the moderate Zionist narrative (perceiving the relations as fairly bad), 31.2% held the balanced narrative (medium relations), 29.4% held the moderate Palestinian narrative (fairly good relations) and 3.8% held the extreme Palestinian narrative (good relations) (12.2% did not respond). Here again the Zionist narratives (6.6% + 16.8% = 23.4%) are held by fewer than the 64.4% who held the contrasting narratives (31.2% + 29.4% + 3.8%). The implication: the allegedly inherent inclination toward negative relations is not widely adopted in Israel.

Another question (8) addressed one of the main historical topics in the history of the conflict: **the reasons for the departure of Palestinian refugees during the 1948 War of Independence**. This relates to the Palestinian refugee problem, one of the core issues to be resolved in a peace process between the rival parties. The findings, on a 3-point spectrum: 40.8% held the Zionist narrative (the Palestinians who became refugees left due to fear and the calls of their leaders to leave), 39.2% held the balanced narrative (left due to fear and calls to leave as well as expulsions by the Jews), while 8% held the Palestinian narrative (expulsions); 12% did not respond. In other words, a small majority of the respondents (39.2% + 8% = 47.2%) believe that expulsions did take place in 1948, more than those who believe they did not take place (40.8%).

Another question (10) addressed **the main reasons for the entry into Israel of Arab/Palestinian infiltrators between the end of the 1948 War of Independence and the beginning of the Sinai War in 1956?** The findings: 12.4% held an extreme Zionist narrative (All of them entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts - such as murder and sabotage[63]), 20.2% held the moderate Zionist narrative (most of them entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts), 32.2% held the balanced narrative (about half entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts, while the other half entered for economic-social reasons - such as cultivation of fields and visiting relatives), 12.2% held the moderate Palestinian

[62] This narrative is here termed "Zionist" because it represents the relations between the two parties as inherently bad, not only more recently due to the conflict, but also in the distant past, when the Palestinians were the stronger majority in the Land of Israel and the Jews were the vulnerable minority.

[63] This narrative is here entitled "Zionist" because, from the perspective of the Israelis it represents the infiltrators very negatively, especially when compared to the Palestinian narrative of this topic.

narrative (most infiltrators entered for economic-social reasons) and 2% held the extreme Palestinian narrative (all entered for economic-social reasons) (21% did not respond). In other words, only 32.6% (12.4% + 20.2%) held Zionist narratives, those that portray the infiltrators more negatively in the eyes of the Israelis.

The final example of a relatively **low proportion of respondents holding** self-serving Zionist narratives deals with **the primary reasons for the eruption of the 1987 first Palestinian uprising/Intifada** (question 17). The findings: 40.8% held Zionist narratives – 23.6% claiming that it was mainly due to a natural hatred towards Israel (extreme Zionist narrative) and 17.2% – somewhat due to hatred (moderate Zionist); [64] 32% held the balanced narrative (the reasons were more or less equally due to hatred and other reasons such as unwillingness to be controlled by Israel and harsh treatment by Israel); while 13% held Palestinian narratives: 6.6% - somewhat due to other reasons (moderate Palestinian), or 6.4% - mainly due to other reasons (extreme Palestinian) (1.2% did not respond). In other words, the largest proportion of the respondents, 45% (32% + 6.6% + 6.4%) held narratives that do not exclusively attribute the eruption of the Intifada to a natural hatred of Israel, more than the percentage of people holding Zionist narratives, 40.8% (23.6% + 17.2%).

Nevertheless, regarding many other historical issues **the Israeli popular memory was found to be inclined towards a strong grasp of the Zionist narratives**; here are five such examples.

In question 2, we asked about **the degree of sincerity of Israeli efforts versus those of the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to achieve peace throughout the conflict.** This is a central topic because peace negotiations are the tool to resolve the conflict and an insincere party is responsible for the failure of the negotiations thereby allowing for the continuation of the conflict. The findings: 57.4% held Zionist narratives (27% extreme Zionist - Israel was very sincere but the Arabs were not sincere, and 30.4% moderate Zionist - Israel was somewhat sincere and the Arabs were not), 28.2% held the balanced narrative (both parties

[64] These narratives are here termed "Zionist" because, from the perspective of the Israelis, they represent the Palestinians very negatively, as acting out of a natural hatred of Israel and not due to Israel's seizing of the territories and its harsh treatment of the Palestinians. This means that no blame is put on Israel for the eruption of the Intifada.

were sincere in about an equal degree), and only 2% held Palestinian narratives (the Arabs were somewhat sincere and Israel was not – moderate Palestinian, or the Arabs were very sincere and Israel was not – extreme Palestinian) (12.4% did not respond). This means that most of the respondents viewed Israel positively and the Arabs/Palestinians negatively, a group twice as large as those who held the balanced narrative.

Another question, 6, addressed the United Nations Partition Plan resolution of 1947, dealing with the establishment of the states of Israel and Palestine. The question was: A**ccording to the United Nations partition resolution of 1947, what proportion of Eretz-Israel were the Palestinians supposed to get, relative to their representation in the population?** The findings: 29.2% held Zionist narratives (10% extreme Zionist - A part of the land much bigger than their representation in the population, and 19.2% moderate Zionist - A part of the land bigger than their representation),[65] 20.4% held a balanced narrative (A part of the land equal to their representation), while 23.8% held Palestinian narratives (19% moderate Palestinian - A part of the land smaller than their representation, and 4.8% extreme Palestinian - A part of the land much smaller than their representation) (26.6% did not respond). As we can see, the majority of the respondents (29.2% + 20.4% + 19% = 68.6%) held inaccurate narratives that do not justify the Palestinian objection to the UN resolution, while only the 4.8% held the Palestinian narrative, a narrative that justifies the Palestinian objection.

Question 9 asked: **What proportion of Israeli-Arabs (excluding those in East Jerusalem) have planned or taken part in terrorist activities against Israel from the War of Independence to the present?** The findings: 21.8% held Zionist narratives (4.8% extreme Zionist - Almost all Israeli-Arabs did that, and 17% moderate Zionist - Most of them did that),[66] 15.6% held a balanced narrative (about half of them did that), and 52.8% held Palestinian narratives (35.8% moderate Palestinian - A minority of them did that, and 17% extreme Palestinian

[65] These narratives are entitled "Zionist" because they represent a state of affairs that does not justify the objection of the Palestinians to the 1947 United Nations resolution, as actually took place. According to these narratives, the resolution was a just one, since the Palestinians got a portion of land bigger/much bigger than their representation in the population in that land. It should be noted that the truth is that, at the time of the resolution the Palestinians constituted about 2/3 of the population in the land, but the resolution granted them 44% of the land. Therefore, on this issue/question, the correct narrative is largely the Palestinian one.

[66] These narratives are termed "Zionist" because they represent the Palestinians very negatively, as if most or almost all of them have planned or taken part in terrorist activities against Israel.

- An insignificant minority of them) (9.8% did not respond). In fact, the Palestinian narrative is the correct one (Samocha, 2001), but only 17% of the respondents held it.

Question 19 asks: **Who is responsible for the failure of the peace process based on the Oslo agreements of the 1990s?** This is a central topic because the Oslo agreements were the cornerstone of the 1990s peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. The findings: 50.6% held Zionist narratives blaming the Palestinians for the failure of the process,[67] 28.4% held a balanced narrative (both parties are more or less equally responsible), while only 6% held Palestinian-inclined narratives (largely blaming Israel for the failure) (15% did not respond). Conclusion: a strong majority of the respondents put the blame on the Palestinians.

Finally, in question 21 we addressed **the reasons for the failure of the peace negotiations between Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat in Camp David in the summer of 2000**. Again, this is a central topic because these were the last negotiations held before the eruption of the Second Intifada in September 2000. The findings, on a 3-point spectrum: 55.6% held the Zionist narrative (Barak offered Arafat a very generous peace agreement but Arafat declined mainly because he did not want peace), 25.4%, the balanced narrative (both parties are responsible for the failure since, for example, Barak's offer was insufficiently generous and Arafat was unwilling to make compromises) and only 3%, the Palestinian narrative (Arafat did want peace but Barak was not generous enough in meeting the needs of the Palestinians) (16% did not respond). As we can see, the majority of respondents blamed Arafat for the failure of the negotiations.

6.2. Bivariate correlations of the research factorss

Table 3 (in Appendix D) presents descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between all the research factors.

Given the desperate situation of the peace process in the Middle East at the time of the survey (summer 2008), we were not surprised to find that the level of support for compromises was relatively low (M = 2.60, SD = 1.48), the level of

[67] These narratives are entitled "Zionist" because they represent the Palestinians very negatively, as being responsible for the failure of the process.

openness to new alternative information was also low, slightly below the mid-point of the scale (M = 3.38, SD = 1.25), and the correlation between these two factors was high and positive, suggesting that people who are open to new alternative information about the conflict tend to be more supportive of compromises.

To guide the analysis of the data, we will now describe major correlations between the **independent** factor categories (i.e., approaches to life, approaches to the Jews and socio-demographics) and the **mediating** factors (i.e., general conflict approaches and openness to alternative information) – both types of categories in relation to the two **dependent** factors (i.e., support for compromises or support for military measures).

As for **approaches to life**, as expected, conformism, traditionalism and entity theories (i.e., rigid character) are negatively correlated with support for compromises and are positively correlated with support for military measures. This means that people who hold these values and theories will support fewer compromises and more military measures. The opposite is partly true with universalism; it is positively correlated with support for compromises.

As for **approaches to the Jews,** as expected, ethnocentrism, siege mentality and angst are negatively correlated with support for compromises and are positively correlated with support for military measures. So people who have these characteristics will support fewer compromises and more military measures. The opposite is partly true, and surprisingly, identity is positively correlated with support for compromises.

As for **socio-demographics,** as expected, religiosity and political attitude are positively correlated with support for compromises and are negatively correlated with support for military measures. The more secular and left-wing oriented people are, the more they are inclined to support compromises, and the reverse for military measures. Education was partially correlated – people with higher education are more supportive of compromises.

As for **general conflict approaches**, as expected, ethos and emotions are negatively correlated with support for compromises and positively correlated with support for military measures, meaning, people who hold a high level of ethos and of negative emotions against the Palestinians are less supportive of compromises and more supportive of military measures. The reverse is true with regard to memory – it is positively correlated with support for compromises and

negatively correlated with support for military measures. Thus, people who hold a critical/post-Zionist historical narrative of the conflict are more supportive of compromises and less supportive of military measures.

6.3. Assessment of the initially-suggested model

The bivariate correlation analysis provides a preliminary look into the relations between the various research factors. Such an analysis, however, does not provide substantial insights about the relative effect of each factor or about the general nature of the model. To address these limitations, we used structural equation modeling (SEM), using version 19 of the AMOS program which enables a full information maximum likelihood procedure (Arbuckle, 2003).

Owing to the large number of factors, we used path modeling with indices as indicators. The results of the tested model are presented in Figure 2 (Appendix E) and the parameter estimates in Appendix F, with bivariate correlations and error terms omitted for simplicity. As we can see, despite its complexity, the model fits the data very well: normative fit index (NFI) = .93, incremental fit index (IFI) = .96, comparative fit index (CFI) = .96, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .049 (chi-square statistic was significant), X^2 (77) = 169.85 (N = 500; $p < .001$). Significantly, all of the direct regression weights are significant,[68] and this also holds true for indirect regression weights.[69] Moreover, the covariance of all the exogenous factors (general worldviews and socio-demographics) are significant. In order to clarify the model's presentation, we describe its details along with the findings.

Analyzing Figure 2 in Appendix E, we can see that the eight factors representing worldviews (to life – conformism, traditionalism, universalism and implicit theories, as well as to Jews - ethnocentrism, identity, siege mentality and angst), and the five socio-demographic factors (religiosity, gender, political attitude, age and education) were specified in the initially suggested model (Figure 1 in Appendix C) as exogenous/independent factors. They were assumed to predict the dependent factors (support for compromises or for military measures) directly as well as indirectly through the mediating effects of general

[68] Only two of them were marginally significant: the impact of ethnocentrism on memory ($p = .082$) and universalism on memory ($p = .089$).

[69] Only three of them were marginally significant: the impact of religiosity on compromise with Palestinians ($p = .067$) and on using military means ($p = .065$), as well as the impact of ethnocentrism on the ethos ($p = .077$).

approaches to conflict (i.e., ethos, memory and emotions) and openness to alternative information. Eventually, however, the **age and education** factors were not significantly associated with either the dependent or the mediating factors, and therefore these factors were omitted from the model presented in Figure 2 (Appendix E); all the other initially suggested factors remained in the validated model, presented in Figure 2. As hypothesized in our initially suggested model, the results presented in Figure 2 show close associations between different exogenous factors (worldviews and socio-demographics) and specific views about the conflict. Let us now address the results in detail, based on Figure 2 (Appendix E).

Specifically, starting with the **dependent factors**: regarding the impact of views about life: **Conformism** was found to increase ethos (.11) and decrease openness to alternative information (-.10); **traditionalism** was found to increase negative emotions towards the Palestinians (.16); **universalism** was found to promote a more critical memory (.07), lead to fewer negative emotions towards the Arabs/Palestinians (-.11) and promote openness to alternative information (.26); and lastly – **entity theory** (one of the implicit theories) was found to increase ethos (.11), decrease support for compromises (-.08) and increase support for military measures (.19).

As for the impact of views of the Jews: **Ethnocentrism** was found to promote a Zionist memory (-.08) and a strong ethos (.10); **identity** was also found to promote a Zionist memory (-.18); **siege mentality** was found to promote ethos (.24), negative emotions towards Arabs/Palestinians (.15) and a Zionist memory (-.26); and lastly, **angst** was found to promote ethos (.10).

Socio-demographics wise: **Religiosity** was found to be influential, in the sense that being more secular promotes openness to alternative information (.08); **gender** – Women are more supportive of military measures (.15) and hold less negative emotions towards Arabs/Palestinians (-.27); and lastly – **political attitude** was found to be influential, in the sense that leftish attitudes promote less negative emotions towards Arabs/Palestinians (-.14), lower levels of ethos (-.20), a more critical memory (.25), less support for military measures (-.19) and more support for compromises (.32).

Moving to the **mediating factors**: **Ethos** – was found to decrease openness to alternative information (-.13), decrease support for compromises (-.18) and increase support for military measures (.22); a critical **memory** was found to

increase openness to alternative information (.18) and support for compromises (.19) as well as decrease ethos (-.32); negative **emotions** were found to increase ethos (.10), decrease openness to alternative information (-.14) and increase support for military measures (.09). Lastly, **openness to alternative information** was found to increase support for compromises (.12) and decrease support for military measures (-.14).

Integration of all the above results with previous findings lead to the understanding that people's worldviews and general view of the conflict influence their support for compromises or using military means, both directly and through the mediation of openness to alternative information. Overall, the initially-suggested model presented in Figure 1 was confirmed by the results of the findings presented in Figure 2 – **the model was found to be valid**.

6.4. Alternative models

In order to reaffirm the suitability of the model, we compared it with four alternative models that might have some theoretical merit. The **first** was a 'direct model', in which all mediation paths were omitted and only direct paths were specified (i.e., general conflict approaches and openness to information were converted into exogenous factors). Running this model, we found that most of regression weights were highly insignificant. We thus concluded that many indirect impacts take place, and therefore this alternative model is not suitable. In the **second** alternative model, we omitted the direct paths between the three repertoire components (ethos, memory and emotions) and the dependent factors. The aim was to examine whether a model in which openness to alternative information fully (and not partially, as in the suggested model) mediates the effects of the repertoire on the dependent factors would fit the data better. In a **third** alternative model, we reversed the causal direction between the two types of mediating factors: the openness to alternative information came before the three components of the psychological repertoire, influencing them (and not **after**, as in the suggested model). In the **fourth** and last alternative model, we reversed the causal direction between worldviews and general conflict approaches (repertoire), making the former come **after** the latter. The fit measures of the last three alternative models are presented below in Table 2.

Table 2. Alternative Models: Fit Indices and Model Comparison

	X^2	D.F.	CFI	IFI	NFI	RMSEA	EVIC	AIC
Suggested model 1	**169.8***	**77**	**.960**	**.961**	**.931**	**.049**	**.64**	**321.85**
Alternative model 2	222*	80	.939	.941	.910	.060	.74	368
Alternative model 3	194.5*	77	.950	.951	.921	.055	.69	346.50
Alternative model 4	247.8*	81	.928	.930	.900	.064	.79	391.82

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$.

As we can see, all fit measures of the suggested model were better than their parallels in the alternative models. Given that two of the alternative models (i.e., numbers 3 and 4) were not nested within the original model, we used two additional fit measures – AIC and EVIC, that are commonly used to compare non-nested models which include the same set of factors (Kumar and Sharma, 1999). As presented also in Table 3, the AIC and EVIC measures are lower in the suggested model compared to all alternative models, indicating that the suggested model fits the data better than the alternatives ones.

7. Summary and discussion

The discussion of the results is divided into three parts. First, the descriptive findings will be discussed. The second part will try to illuminate the descriptive part by describing the characteristics of those who tend to hold Zionist collective memory. The third part will discuss the proposed theoretical model.

7.1. Descriptive findings – The narratives that Israeli-Jews adopt

Descriptively, regarding the distribution of the adoption of the narratives within the study population, it can largely be said that about 60% of that population adopted the Zionist narratives (extreme Zionist – about 15% and moderate Zionist – the remaining about 45%), about 25% adopted the critical/balanced narrative and only about 5% - the Palestinian narratives (c. 10% did not respond). These findings show that, in the period of the study, August-September 2008, a majority of Jews in Israel adopted the hegemonic narrative propagated by the state especially during the first decades of the existence of Israel and then after the

failure of the Camp David negotiations and the outbreak of the intifada in 2000. The particular months of August-September 2008 were relatively favorable to Israeli-Palestinian relations because during this time the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the Palestinian President Abu Mazen carried on intensive negotiations to resolve the conflict. They eventually stopped without agreement in the fall of 2008 and since then the conflict has severely deteriorated.

This situation means that in this segment of the society (the above 60%) we can find rightists and probably a proportion of the centrists. It also means that various Israeli-Jews continue to hold one-sided narratives about various historical topics, narratives that are simplistic, black-and-white by nature and that unrealistically portray the Jews very positively and/or the Arabs/Palestinians very negatively. Such a state of affairs inhibits progress for peace because it promotes negative emotions and distrust towards the Arabs/Palestinians and de-legitimizes them as partners for peace. Of special importance are general questions that pertain to the holistic view of the conflict. Almost half of the Jews (43.3%) blame the Arabs and the Palestinians solely for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation, and an additional 46% blame both sides. Moreover, about 57% of the Jews believed that Israel was sincere in efforts to achieve peace but that the Arabs were not; 57.6% attributed the violence of the Palestinian to their nature. In addition, these results show lack of knowledge by a significant proportion of Jews regarding some key events that are based on firm data. As such, 40.8% of the Jews believed that the Palestinians who became refugees in 1948 war left their homes due to fear and the calls of their leaders to leave (in reality, a high percentage were expelled by the Jews). Regarding the proportion of Eretz-Israel the Palestinians were supposed to receive, relative to their representation in the population, according to the 1947 UN 1947 partition resolution, only 23.8% of the Jews knew the facts and the rest were incorrectly biased. (In reality, the Palestinians, who constituted about 67% of the population at that time, were to get 48% of the land.) Similarly, in response to the question: What proportion of the Israeli-Arabs (excluding those in East Jerusalem) have planned or taken part in terrorist activities against Israel from the War of Independence until the present? Only 17% knew that an insignificant minority have taken part in terror activity and 37.4% blew up the proportion, saying that either all, or a majority or half have carried out terror activities. Finally, only 36.6% knew that Arabs constituted a

majority before the Jewish pioneers began arriving at the end of the nineteenth century. (In reality they constituted about 95%).

The same trend was found with regard to the evaluation of various key events during the conflict. Jews in general tended to judge the intentions of Arabs and Palestinians negatively, but viewed favorably the motivations of Jews and their actions. For example, the eruption of the 1987 first Palestinian uprising/Intifada was attributed by 40.8 % of the Jews mainly to natural hatred towards Israel and 32% to hatred and other reasons; 58.4% attributed the violence between the Jews and Palestinians that occurred in Palestine from the end of the nineteenth century until the eruption of the War of Independence mostly to Palestinians. These findings are not surprising in view of the long-lasting intractable conflict. Although, through the 100 years of its existence, it has changed form and intensity, eventually, even with the attempts to resolve it peacefully, it has continuously remained violent. Moreover, there have always been significant sectors of the society that have objected to any compromises and supported the ideology of "greater Israel" (Israeli control of the entire land) on the basis of religious, national, historical and/or security reasons. Finally, we must remember that this is the nature of popular memory in general and especially during an intractable conflict: to be selective and biased, favoring one's own group and delegitimizing the rival. But still we find a proportion of society members who tend to have a more complex view and see more angles in judging events and in general evaluations of the Arabs, and there is also a very small minority that tends to view the conflict from the Palestinian perspective.

That said, as we have seen in the first part of chapter 6.1, regarding various other topics, many Israeli-Jews adopt moderate-Zionist (45%) or even critical (25%) narratives, a situation that is encouraging from the point of view of promoting peace.

For example, question 3 addressed the **quality of the relations between the Jews and the Palestinians in the Land of Israel in the years preceding the arrival of the Zionist pioneers in the late nineteenth century**. The findings: 6.6% held an extreme Zionist narrative (perceiving the relations between the two groups as very bad), 16.8% held the moderate Zionist narrative (perceiving the relations as fairly bad), 31.2% held the balanced narrative (medium relations), 29.4% held the moderate Palestinian narrative (fairly good relations) and 3.8% held the extreme Palestinian narrative (good relations) (12.2% did not respond).

A second example is question 10 that addressed **the main reasons for the entry into Israel of Arab/Palestinian infiltrators between the end of the 1948 War of Independence and the beginning of the Sinai War in 1956?** The findings: 12.4% held an extreme Zionist narrative (All of them entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts - such as murder and sabotage[70]), 20.2% held the moderate Zionist narrative (most of them entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts), 32.2% held the balanced narrative (about half entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts, while the other half entered for economic-social reasons - such as cultivation of fields and visiting relatives), 12.2% held the moderate Palestinian narrative (most infiltrators entered for economic-social reasons) and 2% held the extreme Palestinian narrative (all entered for economic-social reasons) (21% did not respond).

Similarly, the Israeli-Jewish index of popular memory of the conflict was diagnosed as situated at point 2.4, between the moderate-Zionist and the balanced narratives – also an encouraging sign.

7.2. The characterization of Israeli-Jews who hold Zionist narratives

The findings of this study show that there is a strong correlation between holding Zionist hegemonic popular memory and political orientation of .52, meaning that the more a person identified with the rightist political orientation, the more s/he embraced the Zionist popular memory. An even higher correlation was found between the scale of the popular memory and identification with Jews in Israel (.77). In general, we can assume that individuals who are in the rightist camp, also retain the Zionist popular memory as a holistic system, as there is also a correlation between questions that referred to facts and the section referring to general evaluations of the conflict and the rival.

We also found a series of correlations that provide interesting observations about those who hold Zionist popular memory one-sidedly and simplistically black and white: a correlation between holding the Zionist narrative and ethnocentrism .35; and "entity theory", which posits that group qualities are fixed and unchangeable .22; and value of conformism .21; and value of traditionalism .21; and authoritarianism .27. In addition, with regard to ethos of conflict, the more a person holds the Zionist collective memory, the more s/he justifies the

[70] This narrative is here entitled "Zionist" because, from the perspective of the Israelis it represents the infiltrators very negatively, especially when compared to the Palestinian narrative of this topic.

Jewish goals of the conflict (.26), the more s/he delegitimizes Arabs (.50) and the more s/he feels collective victimhood in the conflict (.48). Similarly, s/he feels more hatred (.27), fear (.11) and anger (.26). Of special interest is the correlation between holding Zionist hegemonic popular memory and closure. The more a person holds Zionist popular memory, the more s/he refuses to be exposed to alternative information coming from Palestinians. Finally, this kind of person tends to object to compromises (.54) and supports use of military means against Palestinians (.38). So we can clearly see a profile of people who hold the hegemonic narratives of collective memory propagated by the Israeli authorities. Such a person appears to be conservative and authoritarian, with negative feelings against Palestinians and adherence to the ethos of conflict. None of these findings is surprising because conceptually, conservative world views as expressed in the assessed characteristics are related to negative feelings and negative stereotyping of the opponent, and protective views towards one's own group (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). In the case of a conflict, conservative individuals tend to be closedminded and support hawkish views regarding the conflict. In general, as this study also shows, the more closed a person is to alternative information, the more hawkish views s/he has regarding the conflict.

7.3. Discussion of the proposed model

The final analysis of the study examined the proposed process of the place popular memory has between antecedent factors, mediating factors and their outcomes. By means of structural equation modeling, findings on the general level are consistent with the hypothesized causal chain (see Figures 1 in Appendix C and 2 in Appendix E). On the very general level the model indicates that the **independent** factors of **world views** as an antecedent consist of eight factors – about **life** (values of conformism, traditionalism and universalism together with the entity theory) and about the **Jewish people** (ethnocentrism, identity, siege mentality and angst), in addition to socio-demographics - all are related to the support of hawkish/dovish policies through two levels of **mediating** variables. The first level includes the **general conflict socio-psychological repertoire** (ethos, popular memory and emotions) while the second level refers to **openness to alternative information**. All these factors, directly or indirectly, influence the **dependent** factors – support for compromises or military measures.

In this process, of special interest is the finding that the socio-psychological repertoire of conflict, first of all, mediates the openness to alternative information, and it is this openness that eventually leads to the appearance of the readiness to compromise on the key dividing issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or alternatively, to support military measures. This means that closure to alternative information emerges as a crucial factor in the maintenance of non-compromising views of society members, that is, the unwillingness to be exposed to information that may contradict the held views about the conflict closes the society members in their views and emotions which support the continuation of the conflict. We assume that that this closure occurs because of the freezing of the popular memory of the conflict, as a result of the rigid structure as well as motivational and emotional factors. Closure is the source of human stagnation. Without exposure to information that refutes their held beliefs, human beings usually have difficulty in changing their repertoire. Thus, many people sink into their self-perpetuating thinking, and without exposure to new information, they are doomed to adhere to the same ideas (Bar-Tal and Halperin, 2011).

In addition, it is important to note that the two key themes of popular memory and ethos of conflict -delegitimization and collective self-victimhood - together with negative emotions which were the mediating variables, directly fed closure to alternative information. Individuals who hold societal beliefs about delegitimization of the Palestinians and self-collective views of being victims, and who experience negative emotional sentiments of hatred, anger, fear and despair about the conflict and the Palestinians tend to be less willing to get new alternative information about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and about the Palestinians. Delegitimization as an extreme type of negative stereotyping magnifies the difference between the groups in conflict, homogenizes the delegitimized group as one entity, automatically arouses strong negative emotions and supplies rigid and persistent durable categories that are unlikely to change while the conflict lasts, and most probably long after (Bar-Tal and Hammack, 2012). The sense of collective victimhood is a fundamental part of the popular memory and a major theme in the ethos of conflict in societies involved in intractable conflict. It is based on continuous harm or even a major traumatic event to which a group was subjected and thus the more and the longer the society experiences harm (especially human losses) in conflict, and the more intensive and extensive is the view that the harm is undeserved and unjust, the more

prevalent and entrenched is the collective sense of being the victim (Bar-Tal et al, 2009). It positions the Israeli-Jewish society members in a particular state of mind and also provides also rigid and durable self-perception.

Looking at the **antecedents** of **popular memory** we found it to be influenced by universalism, ethnocentrism, identity and siege mentality; while, as for its **consequences,** this memory influences the ethos directly the support for compromises and indirectly (through the openness to alternative information) the support for military measures.

As for the **extent of the impact of the factors**, relating only to significant impacts (about .25 and above), among the **dependent** factors, **political attitude** was found to be significant (.32 on support for compromises and .25 on memory), **gender** had a strong impact on emotions (-.27), **universalism** had a strong impact on openness to alternative information (.26), and **siege mentality** had a strong impact on memory (-.26). Memory also had a strong impact on ethos (-.32).

In order to reaffirm the suitability of the model, we compared it with four alternative models which might have gained some theoretical merit and saw that the suggested model fits the data better than the alternatives ones. Thus, **the suggested model was validated**.

7.4. In conclusion

The present study confirmed the key role that popular memory plays in the repertoire of societies involved in intractable conflict. This memory, together with the ethos of conflict, serves as an ideological basis of culture of conflict. Both are learned at the early age and then maintained by the societies through the educational system and other societal institutions. We see that in Israeli-Jewish society, in spite of the fact that already in the late seventies, information began to appear in public that corrected many of the beliefs included in the popular memory, many members of this society continued to hold myths and misinformation about the history of the conflict. This is not surprising in view of the fact that the conflict not only is still going on but has also escalated. Society members need the functional narrative in order to feel just, moral, differentiated from the enemy- all in order to mobilize on its behalf and even to sacrifice one's

own life. But we have also detected that many Israeli Jews hold a more complex-critical view of the conflict. This finding is encouraging from the perspective of advancing peace, since, as we have seen, the more the Jews adopt the balanced narrative, the more their psychological reactions towards the Palestinians are ameliorated, increasing the chances for their support of a peace agreement with the Palestinians. Thus, there is a kernel of hope that Israeli society members will open their eyes and ears to absorb valid information about the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict.

8. Appendixes

Appendix A: The 23 Memory Questions/Topics

1. Which of the following sentences best describes your opinion with regard to the distribution of responsibility between the Jews and Arabs (including Palestinians) for the outbreak and continuation of the Israeli-Arab conflict?
2. To the best of your knowledge, what was the degree of sincerity of Israeli efforts versus those of the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to achieve peace throughout the conflict?
3. To the best of your knowledge, what was the quality of the relations between the Jews and Palestinians in Eretz-Israel (the land of Israel) in the centuries that preceded the beginning of the Zionist immigration to Eretz-Israel in the end of the 19th century?
4. To the best of your knowledge, what portion of the entire population of Eretz-Israel consisted of Palestinians before the Jewish pioneers began arriving at the end of the 19th century?
5. To the best of your knowledge, who is responsible for the violence between the Jews and Palestinians that occurred in Eretz-Israel from the end of the 19th century until the eruption of the War of Independence?
6. According to the United Nations' division resolution of '47, what portion of Eretz-Israel were the Palestinians supposed to get, relative to their representation in the population?
7. What portion of the Palestinians wanted to initiate a war against the Jews following the UN resolution of '47 for the establishment of Israel?
8. What were the reasons for the departure of Palestinian refugees during the War of Independence?
9. What portion of the Israeli-Arabs (excluding those in East Jerusalem) have planned or taken part in terrorist activities against Israel since the War of Independence until today?
10. What were the main reasons for the entry into Israel of Arab/Palestinian infiltrators between the end of the War of Independence and the beginning of the Sinai War in '56?
11. Why did Israel initiate the '56 Sinai War?
12. What was Israel's motivation in initiating the '67 Six Day War?

13. Where there peace initiatives between Israel and the Arab countries prior to the ‘73 Yom Kippur War?
14. What were Israel's aims in the '82 Lebanon War?
15. What were the reasons for establishing settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?
16. What have been the main reasons for violence against Israel by the Palestinian terrorist organizations?
17. What were the primary reasons for eruption of the '87 Intifada?
18. To what extent did the IDF (Israeli army) exhibit moral conduct (refraining from illegal violent activities) during the ‘87 Intifada?
19. Who is responsible for the failure of the peace process based on the Oslo agreements of the ‘90s?
20. To what extent was the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt implemented by the Egyptian government?
21. What were the reasons for the failure of the negotiations between Barak and Arafat in Summer 2000?
22. What were the reasons for the eruption of the 2000 Intifada?
23. What was the extent of moral conduct during fighting (“purity of arms”) by the Jews throughout the conflict?

Appendix B: The Results (answers/narratives) of the 23 Memory Questions/Topics

(i.e., what percentage of the Israeli-Jews adopts which narrative per each topic)

1. * **Which of the following sentences best describes your opinion with regard to the distribution of responsibility between the Jews and Arabs (including Palestinians) for the outbreak and continuation of the Israeli-Arab conflict?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	The Arabs (including the Palestinians) are primarily responsible for the outbreak of the conflict and its continuation	43.4
2	The Arabs and the Jews are more or less equally responsible	46
3	The Jews are primarily responsible	4.2
4	Do not know	6.4
	Total	100

2. * **To the best of your knowledge, what was the degree of sincerity of Israeli efforts versus those of the Arabs (including the Palestinians) to achieve peace throughout the conflict**?		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Israel was very sincere but the Arabs were not sincere	27
2	Israel was somewhat sincere and the Arabs not	30.4
3	Both parties were sincere in about an equal degree	28.2
4	The Arabs were somewhat sincere and Israel not	1.6
5	The Arabs were very sincere and Israel not	0.4
6	Do not know	12.4
	Total	100

3. *** To the best of your knowledge, what was the quality of the relations between the Jews and Palestinians in Eretz-Israel (the Land of Israel) in the centuries that preceded the beginning of the Zionist immigration to Eretz-Israel in the end of the 19th century?**

Relations were:

No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Very bad	6.6
2	Somewhat bad	16.8
3	Medium	31.2
4	Somewhat good	29.4
5	Very good	3.8
6	Do not know	12.2
	Total	100

4. **To the best of your knowledge, what portion of the entire population of Eretz-Israel consisted of Palestinians before the Jewish pioneers began arriving at the end of the 19th century?**

The Palestinians were:

No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	The exclusive inhabitants of the land	0.6
2	The vast majority	22.8
3	The majority	36.6
4	Minority	15.8
5	An insignificant minority	6.0
6	Do not know	18.2
	Total	100

5. **To the best of your knowledge, who is responsible for the violence between the Jews and Palestinians that occurred in Eretz-Israel from the end of the 19th century until the eruption of the War of Independence? The source of responsibility for the violence is:**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Only the Palestinians	20.6
2	Mostly the Palestinians	37.8
3	Quite equally both parties	23.8
4	Mostly the Jews	3.6
5	Only the Jews	1.0
6	Do not know	13.2
	Total	100

6. * **According to the United Nations' division resolution of '47, what portion of Eretz-Israel were the Palestinians supposed to get, relative to their representation in the population?** **The Palestinians got according to the resolution:**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	A part of the land much bigger than their representation in the population	10
2	A part of the land bigger than their representation	19.2
3	A part of the land equal to their representation	20.4
4	A part of the land smaller than their representation	19
5	A part of the land much smaller than their representation	4.8
6	Do not know	26.6
	Total	100

7. **What portion of the Palestinians wanted to initiate a war against the Jews following the UN resolution of '47 for the establishment of Israel?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	The vast majority of the Palestinians wanted to initiate a war	26.8
2	The majority	33.6
3	About half	9.8
4	A minority	10.6
5	An insignificant minority	1.4
6	Do not know	17.8
	Total	100

8. * **What were the reasons for the departure of Palestinian refugees during the War of Independence?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	The refugees left due to fear and calls of leaders to leave	40.8
2	The refugees left due to fear, calls of leaders and expulsion by the Jews	39.2
3	The refugees were expelled by the Jews	8
4	Do not know	12
	Total	100

9. * **What portion of the Israeli-Arabs (excluding those in East Jerusalem) have planned or taken part in terrorist activities against Israel since the War of Independence until today?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Almost all Israeli-Arabs acted like this	4.8
2	Most of them acted like this	17
3	About half of them	15.6
4	A minority of them	35.8
5	An insignificant minority of them	17
6	Do not know	9.8
	Total	100

10. * **What were the main reasons for the entry into Israel of Arab/Palestinian infiltrators between the end of the War of Independence and the beginning of the Sinai War in 1956?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	All of them entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts (such as murder and sabotage)	12.4
2	Most of them entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts	20.2
3	About half entered with the intent to commit terrorist acts, while half entered with economic-social aims (such as cultivation of fields and visiting relatives)	32.2
4	Most entered with economic-social aims	12.2
5	All entered with economic-social aims	2
6	Do not know	21
	Total	100

11. **Why did Israel initiate the 1956 Sinai War? Israel attacked:**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Entirely because it had no other alternatives in response to aggressive actions by the Arabs	28.6
2	Mostly because it had no other alternatives	30
3	Partly because it had no other alternatives and partly because it sought to conquer and control Egyptian territories	14.2
4	Mostly because it sought to conquer and control Egyptian territories	4.6
5	Entirely because it sought to conquer and control territories	1.6
6	Do not know	21
	Total	100

12. **What was Israel's motivation in initiating the 1967 Six Day War?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Solely as a defense measure in response to war threats by Arab countries	37.2
2	Mostly as a defense measure in response to war threats	34.6
3	Partly as a defense measure and partly because it sought to conquer and control Arab territories	12.8
4	Mostly because it sought to conquer and control Egyptian territories	1.6
5	Solely because it sought to conquer and control territories	2
6	Do not know	11.8
	Total	100

13. **Prior to the '73 Yom Kippur War:**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	There were no peace initiatives between Israel and the Arabs	17.8
2	There were peace initiatives between Israel and the Arabs, but they failed due to the Arabs	20.2
3	There were peace initiatives that failed due to both parties	26.6
4	There were peace initiatives that failed due to the Israelis	5.2
5	Do not know	30.2
	Total	100

14. **What were Israel's aims in the 1982 Lebanon War?** **Israel's aims were:**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Only to prevent terror attacks against it from Lebanon	20.4
2	Mainly to prevent terror attacks from Lebanon	26.4
3	Partly to prevent terror attacks; and partly to build a new regional order in Lebanon	32
4	Mainly to build a new regional order in Lebanon	6
5	Only to build a new regional order in Lebanon	2
6	Do not know	13.2
	Total	100

15. **What were the reasons for establishing settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	For security purposes only, in order to prevent attacks against Israel from these territories	6.6
2	Mainly for security purposes	9.6
3	Quite equally for security purposes and ideological reasons	44
4	Mainly due to ideological reasons	23.2
5	Only due to ideological reasons	10.4
6	Do not know	6.2
	Total	100

16. **What have been the main reasons for violence against Israel by the Palestinian terrorist organizations?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Only the inherently violent nature of the Palestinians	23.8
2	Primarily because of their violent nature	23.8
3	Because of their violent nature of and Israel's behavior during the conflict	31.6
4	Primarily because of Israel's behavior	6.2
5	Entirely because of Israel's behavior	2.6
6	Do not know	12
	Total	100

17. * **What were the primary reasons for eruption of the 1987 Intifada (Palestinian uprising)?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Mainly natural hatred towards Israel	23.6
2	Somewhat due to hatred	17.2
3	More or less equally due to hatred and other reasons (such as unwillingness to be controlled and harsh treatment by Israel)	32
4	Somewhat due to other reasons	6.6
5	Mainly due to other reasons	6.4
6	Do not know	14.2
	Total	100

18. **To what extent did the IDF exhibit moral conduct (refraining from illegal violent activities) during the '87 Intifada? Grade it on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents zero moral conduct and 7 represents absolute moral conduct.**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Zero moral conduct	1.4
2	A little moral conduct	2.6
3	More than a little moral conduct	6.6
4	Medium moral conduct	14.2
5	Significant moral conduct	17.8
6	Almost absolute moral conduct	13.4
7	Absolute moral conduct	23.4
8	Do not know	20.6
	Total	100

19. *** Who is responsible for the failure of the peace process based on the Oslo agreements of the '90s?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	The Palestinians are almost entirely responsible for the failure	25.6
2	The Palestinians are primarily responsible	25
3	Both parties are more or less equally responsible	28.4
4	Israel is primarily responsible	3.2
5	Israel almost entirely	2.8
6	Do not know	15
	Total	100

20. **To what extent was the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt implemented by the Egyptian government?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Minimally	20
2	More than minimally	11.2
3	Medium	33.2
4	More than medium	12.6
5	Fully	8.6
6	Do not know	14.4
	Total	100

21. * **What were the reasons for the failure of the negotiations between Barak and Arafat in Summer 2000?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Barak offered Arafat a very generous peace agreement but Arafat declined mainly because he did not want peace	55.6
2	Both parties are responsible for the failure since, for example, Barak's offer was insufficiently generous, and Arafat was unwilling to make compromises	25.4
3	Arafat did want peace but Barak was not generous enough in meeting the needs of the Palestinians	3
4	Do not know	16
	Total	100

22. **The 2000 Intifada erupted due to:**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Solely because of an a priori plan by Arafat to engage in a violent clash with Israel	22.8
2	Mainly because of an a priori plan by Arafat	23
3	Partly because of an a prioi plan by Arafat and partly a Spontaneous popular uprising	25.8
4	Mainly to a spontaneous popular uprising	9.2
5	Solely to a spontaneous popular uprising	6
6	Do not know	13.2
	Total	100

23. **What was the extent of moral conduct during fighting ("purity of arms") by the Jews throughout the conflict?**		
No.	Possible answers/narratives	% choosing this answer
1	Very high	23
2	High	36.8
3	Medium	28.2
4	Low	4
5	Very low	1.4
6	Do not know	6.6
	Total	100

Appendix C: Figure 1 - Initial Suggested Model of Popular Memory (structure and possible included factors)



* The three components of the Psychological repertoire influence each other.

gender, age, education, family status, being born in the given country or an immigrant, religiosity, politic attitude and income

Appendix D: Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations between all Research Factors

o.	Name of Factor	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
	Approaches to Life																					
1	Conformism	4.5687	.9873	1	.464**	.310**	.181**	.290**	.138**	.170**	.093*	-.209**	.021	-.143**	.020	-.172**	.275**	-.159**	.061	-.110**	-.173**	.151
2	Traditionalism	3.6227	1.3280	.464**	1	.226**	.177**	.513**	.341**	.263**	.154**	-.527**	-.022	-.376**	-.032	-.203**	.330**	-.233**	.240**	-.155**	-.307**	.179
3	Universalism	5.0282	.85525	.310**	.226**	1	-.009	.055	.141**	-.005	.058	-.021	-.064	.149**	.076	-.043	-.005	.075	-.075	-.252**	.091*	-.07
4	Implicit theories	4.0935	1.2142	.181**	.177**	-.009	1	.207**	.074	.199**	.183**	-.028	.040	-.235**	.156**	-.100**	.311**	-.179**	.124**	-.125**	-.255**	.332
	Approaches to Jews																					
5	Ethnocentrism	4.112	1.7198	.290**	.513**	.055	.207**	1	.448**	.279**	.186**	-.491	-.023	-.307**	-.114*	-.200**	.419**	-.319**	.230**	-.142**	-.368**	.185
6	Identity	5.144	1.1085	.138**	.341**	.141**	.074	.448**	1	.205**	.236**	-.306**	-.092*	-.292**	.107**	-.072	.295**	-.322**	.169**	-.030	.233**	.087
7	Siege mentality	4.2994	1.5540	.170**	.263**	-.005	.199**	.279**	.205**	1	.372**	-.202**	-.048	-.330**	.045	-.118**	.527**	-.392**	.257**	-.237**	-.354**	.297
8	Angst	4.7004	1.5349	.093*	.154*	.058	.183**	.186**	.236**	.372**	1	-.096*	-.041	-.262**	.080	-.024	.352**	-.239**	.100*	-.067	-.239**	.232
	Socio Demographics																					
9	Religiosity	4.0971	1.1871	-.209**	-.527**	-.021	-.028	-.491**	-.306**	-.202**	-.096*	1	.089*	.401**	.117**	.040	-.301**	.242**	-.162**	.205**	.316**	-.101
10	Gender	.492	.5000	.021	-.022	-.064	.040	-.023	-.092*	-.048	-.041	.089*	1	-.051	-.078	-.005	-.045	.023	-.269**	.057	-.003	.123
11	Political attitude	3.49	1.262	-.143**	-.376**	.149**	-.235**	-.397**	-.292**	-.330**	-.262**	.401**	-.051	1	.135**	.058	-.518**	.422**	.257**	.306**	.556**	-.421
12	Age	45.82	18.017	.020	-.032	.076	.156**	-.114*	.107*	.045	.080	.117**	-.078	.135**	1	.104*	.046	-.115**	-.157**	-.029	.056	-.03
13	Education	4.3455	1.4496	-.172**	-.203**	-.043	-.110*	-.200**	-.072	-.118**	-.024	.040	-.005	.058	.104*	1	-.160**	.024	-.148**	.103*	.124**	-.03
	General Conflict Approaches																					
14	Ethos	4.5125	1.1880	.275**	.330**	-.005	.311**	.419**	.295**	.527**	.352**	-.301**	-.045	-.518**	.046	-.160**	1	-.580**	.311**	-.343**	-.529**	.449
15	Memory	-.0100	.44222	-.159**	-.233**	.075	-.179**	-.319**	-.322**	.392**	-.239**	.242**	.023	.422**	-.115**	.024	.580**	1	-.204**	.350**	.492**	-.328
16	Emotions	3.5401	1.2210	.061	.240**	-.075	.124**	.230**	.169**	.257**	.100**	-.162**	-.269**	-.257**	-.157**	-.148**	.311**	-.204**	1	-.259**	-.230**	.227
	Information																					
17	Openness to alte. information	3.3758	1.2461	-.110*	-.155**	.252**	-.125**	-.142**	-.030	.237**	-.067	.205**	.057	.306**	-.029	.103*	.343**	.350**	-.259**	1	.357**	-.309
	Specific Conflict Approaches																					
18	Support compromises	2.6063	1.4824	-.173**	-.307**	.091*	-.255**	-.368**	-.223**	-.354**	-.239**	.316**	-.003	.556**	.056	.124**	.529**	.492**	-.230**	.357**	1	-.342
19	Support military measures	3.7818	1.5581	.151.**	.179**	-.077	.332**	.185**	.087	.297**	.232**	-.101**	.123**	-.421**	-.032	-.031	.449**	-.328**	.227**	-.309.**	-.342**	1

* Significant at the p < .05 level; ** significant at the p < .00001 level (two tailed significance).

Appendix E: Figure 2 - Results from a Structural Equation Model Analysis Regarding the Initially Suggested Model

World views, socio-demographics, general views about the conflict, and **openness to alternative information** – all, predicting **specific views about the conflict**: support for compromises and the use of military measures.



Appendix F: Table 4 - Estimates of Independent/Exogenous Research Factors

(World Views and Socio-Demographics)

Factor A ←→	Factor B	Estimates
Siege mentality	Jewish Angst	.361
Conformism	Traditionalism	.425
Ethnocentrism	Traditionalism	.478
Jewish identity	Jewish ethnocentrism	.421
Jewish Ethnocentrism	Conformism	.209
Jewish Identity	Traditionalism	.279
Jewish identity	Jewish Angst	.124
Implicit theories	Siege mentality	.185
Ethnocentrism	Implicit theories	.099
Traditionalism	religiosity	-.514
Ethnocentrism	religiosity	-.486
Jewish identity	religiosity	-.290
Jewish Angst	Political attitude	-.205
Implicit theories	Political attitude	-.190
Siege mentality	Political attitude	-.208
religiosity	Political attitude	.360
Traditionalism	Political attitude	-.279
Ethnocentrism	Political attitude	-.325
Jewish identity	Political attitude	-.267
Implicit theories	Jewish Angst	.165
Universalism	Political attitude	.203
Conformism	Universalism	.323
Traditionalism	Universalism	.202
Conformism	religiosity	-.160

* All relations are significant.
Significant at the $p < .05$ level; ** significant at the $p < .00001$ level (two tailed significance).

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