Ethos of Conflict: The Concept and Its Measurement

Daniel Bar-Tal
Tel Aviv University

Keren Sharvit
University of Haifa

Eran Halperin
Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Herzliya, Israel

Anat Zafran
Tel Aviv University

The main objective of the current research is to construct a scale that measures individual differences in adherence to the ethos of conflict (EOC). The development of such a scale is of importance because EOC is seen as a determinative concept in describing the worldview of society members involved in intractable conflict. The first study shows that the 8 themes of EOC load on a single factor, reflecting a holistic and coherent view of the conflict situation. The second study indicates that the EOC constitutes an independent construct. The third study shows that EOC partially mediates between general conservative orientations and judgments of specific solutions proposed to end the conflict. Altogether, the new scale can serve scholars who study sociopsychological mechanisms and dynamics involved in various intractable conflicts around the world.

Keywords: ethos of conflict, intractable conflict, ideology, culture of conflict

Intractable conflicts that last for long periods of time leave their distinctive mark on the collective lives of the involved societies. Members of societies that live under prolonged experiences of intractable conflicts need a particular worldview to provide them with a meaningful epistemic basis that allows them to satisfy their basic psychological needs and achieve their goals. We have proposed that, in order to fulfill these functions, societies engulfed by intractable conflict develop a particular type of worldview, which we have previously defined as the ethos of conflict (EOC; Bar-Tal, 1998a, 2000, 2007a, 2011). EOC is defined as a configuration

---

DANIEL BAR-TAL is Branco Weiss Professor of Research in Child Development and Education at the School of Education, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel. His research interest is in political and social psychology, studying sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts and peace making, as well as development of political understanding among children and peace education. He has published 20 books, over 200 articles and chapters in major social and political psychological journals, books, and encyclopedias, and he received the Lasswell Award for distinguished scientific contribution in the field of political psychology.

KEREN SHARVIT is a Lecturer in the Department of Psychology and the Program for Peace and Conflict Management Studies at the University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel. She was a postdoctoral fellow at the Swiss Center for Conflict research Management and Resolution, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and, later, a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Department of Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park.

ERAN HALPERIN is currently a senior lecturer at the Lauder School of Government and an associate editor of the *International Journal of Political Psychology*. His main line of research focuses on the role of emotions and emotion regulation in conflicts and conflict resolution. In recent years, he has published articles in journals such as *Science*, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, the *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *Journal of Social Issues*, *Political Psychology*, and the *Journal of Peace Research*.

ANAT ZAFRAN is currently working at the Training Department of the Open University of Israel and teaches a variety of courses in the Department of Education and Psychology there. She received her master's degree in social psychology at the Department of Psychology, Tel Aviv University.

WE THANK THE ANONYMOUS REVIEWERS who provided very useful comments and helped to improve the paper.

CORRESPONDENCE CONCERNING THIS ARTICLE should be addressed to Daniel Bar-Tal, School of Education, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel. E-mail: daniel@post.tau.ac.il

of central, shared societal beliefs that provide a particular dominant orientation to a society and give meaning to societal life under conditions of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000). In this conceptual framework, societal beliefs are defined as shared cognitions by society members that address themes and issues with which society members are particularly occupied, and which contribute to their sense of uniqueness (Bar-Tal, 2000). The central societal beliefs of EOC can be viewed as an ideological dogma that facilitates a comprehensive view of the reality; serves as a prism through which society members evaluate their experiences, events, and new information; and provides guiding prescriptions for social action—all in the complex context of intractable conflict.

The aim of the present project was to operationalize the concept of EOC and to demonstrate its empirical utility. Thus, the paper describes the construction of a scale designed to assess individuals' adherence to the EOC, or, in other words, to measure the extent to which individual society members are psychologically embedded in the intractable conflict. We believe that this tool can be adapted to any society involved in intractable conflict and is therefore of conceptual and empirical importance. In the introduction section, we briefly describe the nature of intractable conflicts; next, we describe the evolved EOC; and, finally, we present the current research.

Intractable Conflicts

While many different intergroup conflicts rage worldwide, intractable conflicts receive the most attention because of their serious and harsh implications, first and foremost for the societies involved, and also for the international community (see Azar, 1990; Coleman, 2003; Kriesberg, 1998; Vallacher, Coleman, Nowak, & Bui-Wrzosinska, 2010). The ongoing conflicts in Kashmir, Chechnya, and the Middle East, for example, constitute prototypical cases of intractable conflicts. They are all characterized by a lasting resistance to their peaceful resolution and, consequently, by the persistence of their vicious cycles of violence in which worldviews feed the courses of violent actions, and these, in turn, strengthen the worldviews. These and other intractable conflicts share several common characteristics, especially in their

peak periods. They are conflicts over goals that are perceived as existential, of zero-sum nature, and irresolvable. Furthermore, they are violent, occupy a central place in the lives of the societies involved, demand significant material and psychological investments, and last at least a generation (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 2007a; Kriesberg, 1993, 1998).

These characteristics of intractable conflict imply that society members living under these harsh conditions experience severe and continuous negative psychological effects, such as chronic threat, stress, pain, uncertainty, exhaustion, suffering, grief, trauma, misery, and hardship, both in human and material terms (see, e.g., Cairns, 1996; de Jong, 2002; Hobfoll et al., 1991; Milgram, 1986; Robben & Suarez, 2000). In addition, an intractable conflict requires constant mobilization of society members to support and actively take part in it, even to the extent of willingness to sacrifice their lives. In view of these experiences, society members need to adapt to the harsh conditions by satisfying their basic human needs, learning to cope with the stress, and developing psychological conditions that will be conducive to successfully withstanding the rival group.

A basic premise is that, in order to meet these challenges, societies in intractable conflict develop a functional societal psychological infrastructure that consists of three elements: EOC (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 2007a, in press), collective memories (Cairns & Roe, 2003; Connerton, 1989; Halbwachs, 1992; Paez & Liu, 2011; Wertsch, 2002), and collective emotional orientation (Bar-Tal, 2001; Halperin, Sharvit, & Gross, 2011), which are all interrelated and feed each other (Bar-Tal, 2007a; in press). Eventually, this infrastructure serves as a basis that provides fundamental narratives for the evolved culture of conflict in societies that are engaged in a prolonged intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2010, in press). Since the EOC is one of the central components of this infrastructure and the focus of this paper, the following section describes it in detail.

Ethos of Conflict

EOC supplies the epistemic basis for the hegemonic social consciousness of the society and serves as one of the foundations of societal life in times of intractable conflict. It binds society

members together and connects the present to the aspirations and goals that impel them toward the future. EOC is a relatively stable worldview that creates a conceptual framework, allowing human beings to organize and comprehend the prolonged context of conflict in which they live and to act toward its preservation or alteration in accordance with this standpoint. Therefore, EOC can be viewed as a type of ideology (Eagleton, 1991; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009; Shils, 1968; Van Dijk, 1998). As an ideology, EOC represents a coherent and systematic knowledge base that provides a major rationale for explaining the present state of affairs, directs the decisions of the society's leaders, and serves as a guide to the coordinated behavior of society members, development of the societal system, and its functioning. In addition, it serves as a prism through which society members process new information and judge particular situations that appear periodically throughout the long years of intractable conflict. It is a conservative ideology because its orientation strives to preserve the existing order of continuing the conflict, without taking any risk of moving into uncertainty that peace making requires (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). As Thórisdóttir and Jost (2011) noted, conservative ideology expresses fear of change: "The status quo, no matter how aversive, is a known condition and is therefore easier to predict and imagine than a potentially different state of affairs that could be either better or worse" (p. 789). In this line, we suggest that the EOC may mediate between stable personal conservative tendencies and evaluations of particular conflict-related situations.

Saying all this, it is important to emphasize that EOC may change with time, as ideologies are also altered as a result of long-term changes in the societal conditions. Thus, de-escalation of the intractable conflict, or evolvement of segments of society members who begin to support peaceful resolution of the conflict with alternative ideas, may weaken the adherence to EOC and even lead to the development of alternative ethos of peace that eventually may be a pillar of culture of peace (Bar-Tal, in press). Indeed the large scale study of Oren (2005, 2009) clearly showed how EOC changes in a long perspective of time, in view of major events that transform the conditions of intractable conflict, moving it toward tractability.

In earlier work, it was proposed that the challenges posed by intractable conflict lead to the development of the following eight interrelated themes of societal beliefs that comprise the EOC (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 2000, 2007a; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).

Societal beliefs about the justness of the ingroup's goals outline the goals in conflict, indicate their crucial importance, and provide their explanations and rationales. In addition, the societal beliefs negate and delegitimize the goals of the rival group. These societal beliefs play a crucial motivating role because they present the goals as existential.

Societal beliefs about security concern the appraisal of threats and dangers, and the difficulties of coping with them in situations of intractable conflict, as well as the importance of living in security and the conditions that facilitate its achievement (Bar-Tal & Jacobson, 1998). These beliefs are essential because intractable conflicts involve violence that poses various threats to individuals and collectives alike. Their most important function is to satisfy the basic human need for safety (Burton, 1990; Maslow, 1970).

Societal beliefs positive collective self-image concern the ethnocentric tendency to attribute positive characteristics, values, norms, and patterns of behavior to the ingroup (Baumeister, & Gastings, 1997; Sande, Goethals, Ferrari, & Worth, 1989). They frequently relate to courage, heroism, or endurance, as well as to humaneness, morality, fairness, trustworthiness, and progress. These beliefs allow for a clear differentiation between the ingroup and the rivals, and they supply moral strength and a sense of superiority (Sande et al., 1989).

Societal beliefs of ingroup victimization concern presentation of the ingroup as the victim of unjust harm, evil deeds, and atrocities perpetrated by the adversary (Bar-Tal, Chernyak-Hai, Schori, & Gundar, 2009; Mack, 1990; Volkan, 1997; Vollhardt, in press). They provide the moral incentive to seek justice and to oppose the opponent, as well as to mobilize moral, political, and material support from the international community.

Societal beliefs delegitimizing the opponent concern beliefs that deny the adversary's humanity (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005; Holt & Silverstein, 1989; Opotow, 1990, in press; Rieber, 1991). Specifically, they indicate that

the rival group should be outside the boundaries of commonly accepted groups, and that it should be excluded from the international community as a legitimate member worthy of basic civil and human rights, and thus deserves inhumane treatment (Bar-Tal, 1989, 1990; Bar-Tal & Hammack, in press). These beliefs explain the causes of the conflict's outbreak, its continuation, and the violence of the opponent, and have a special function in justifying the ingroup's own aggressive acts against the rival group (see, e.g., Elizur, & Yishay-Krien, 2009).

Societal beliefs of patriotism generate attachment to the country and society by propagating loyalty, love, care, and sacrifice (Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Somerville, 1981). Patriotic beliefs increase social cohesiveness and dedication.

Societal beliefs of unity refer to the importance of being united in the face of the external threat. These beliefs strengthen the society from within, develop a consensus and a sense of belonging, increase solidarity, and allow the society's forces and energy to be directed at coping with the enemy.

Finally, *societal beliefs of peace* refer to peace as the ultimate goal and desire of the society, and to society members as peace loving. Such beliefs serve the function of inspiring hope and optimism. They strengthen positive self-image and positive self-presentation to the outside world.

It is important to note that some of the belief themes that comprise the EOC can be found in other kinds of groups, not necessarily only in those involved in intractable conflicts. The tendency to delegitimize and dehumanize outgroup members, for example, has been studied in many different contexts (e.g., Echabe & Castro, 1996; Haslam, 2006; Leyens et al., 2001; Struch & Schwartz, 1989), as has the tendency to form a positive view of the ingroup (e.g., Ellemers, Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Luthanen & Crocker, 1992; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, Halevy, & Eidelson, 2008). Patriotism, too, is not unique to societies involved in intractable conflicts (see Bar-Tal & Staub, 1997; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Nevertheless, we propose that in societies that are involved in intractable conflict, the eight themes presented here are interrelated and combine to form a single holistic and coherent ideological worldview that distinguishes these societies from others. The inter-related themes of the ideology, taken together, play an important function in the lives of societies involved in intractable conflict and their individual members. As a mindset, they shed an imprinting light on reality and shape the way it is viewed.

In view of the important role that EOC plays in the lives of the society members involved in intractable conflict, it is not surprising that societies make special efforts to impart and maintain it (Bar-Tal, in press). They not only use societal institutions and channels of communication to socialize society members with its contents but also employ various societal mechanisms to preserve it (e.g., censorship or sanctions).

Measuring Individuals' Adherence to the EOC

The major purpose of the present study is to turn the EOC into a measurable concept. Although the ideology of the EOC typically dominates the institutional and cultural level of societies involved in intractable conflicts, individual society members who also share this worldview may vary in the degree to which they adhere to the societal ethos. The ability to assess these individual differences can reveal the level of hegemony of the ethos and the extent to which society members support the ideology that underlies the continuation of the conflict. Thus, the measurement of adherence to the ethos can reveal not only the personal worldviews of individuals or the level of shared reality but also the extent to which society members have been successfully mobilized for the causes of the conflict, as well as their level of involvement and commitment to the continuation of the conflict. An understanding of these issues can indicate the feasibility of resolving the conflict peacefully, because EOC also serves as a major sociopsychological barrier to peace building (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011: Bar-Tal, Halperin, & Oren, 2010; Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011).

Although measures of certain belief themes (e.g., patriotism, delegitimization, positive group image, victimhood) that are part of the EOC have already been developed and utilized in published work (e.g., Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Leyens et al., 2001; Luthanen & Crocker, 1992; Schori, Klar, & Roccas, 2011), to date, there has been no measure that assesses

the degree of adherence to the EOC as a whole. As mentioned before, we believe that in societies that are involved in intractable conflicts, the different belief themes of the ethos combine to form a distinct, coherent worldview. Therefore, in order to advance the study of EOC, we need a scale that assesses individuals' acceptance of all the belief themes that comprise this ethos. We predict that in the administration of such a scale to a sample of individuals from a society involved in an intractable conflict, the different themes will load on a single factor reflecting a holistic underlying ideology.

The themes of beliefs that comprise the EOC can be found in many societies that are involved in intractable conflicts. However, a measure of adherence to these beliefs in a given society must be adapted to the specific context of a particular conflict. Hence, the items of the scale should pertain to the specific contents that characterize the given society's particular view of the conflict. The measure that we develop in the present research assesses adherence to the EOC among the Jewish Israeli society in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian intractable conflict. We believe, however, that this measure can be easily adapted to other contexts of intractable conflict, with minor modifications. It has, in fact, already been adapted to the Palestinian society by Gayer (2011) and to the Serb society by Medjedovic and Petrovic, (2011).

The Israeli–Palestinian Conflict and the Jewish Israeli EOC

The Israeli–Palestinian conflict has been going on for at least 100 years, as Palestinian nationalism and Zionism, the Jewish national movement, have recurrently clashed over the same land and the right to self-determination, statehood, and justice (see detailed descriptions in Caplan, 2009; Dowty, 2005; Morris, 2001; Wasserstein, 2003).

For a long time, the conflict was a prototypical case of an intractable conflict, but between 1977 and 2000, it began to move toward tractability. The peace treaty with Egypt in 1979—and especially the Oslo Accords with the Palestinians in 1993, and then in 1995—as well as the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 are hallmarks of the peace process that changed the relations between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East. But peace making regressed with the re-escalation of the conflict as a result of the failure of the July 2000 Camp David summit and the eruption of what is now known as the Second Intifada (see analyses by Bar-Siman-Tov, Lavie, Michael, & Bar-Tal, 2007; Drucker, 2002; Enderlin, 2003; Swisher, 2004).

Under the conditions of intractable conflict, Jewish Israeli society developed an EOC. During the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and most of the 1970s, when the Israeli–Arab conflict was fully intractable, the EOC dominated the culture of the society (see an extensive analysis in Bar-Tal, 2007b). During this period, the societal beliefs of the ethos were widely shared by society members, extensively used in public discourse, dominantly appeared in channels of mass communication, and were broadly used for the justification and explanation of decisions, policies, and courses of actions taken by the leaders (Oren, 2005, 2009). They were also expressed in institutional ceremonies, commemorations, and memorials (Arviv Abromovich, 2011), and enjoyed a hegemonic status in cultural products such as literature, films, theater, visual arts, and so forth (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2007b; Ben-Ezer, 1977a, 1977b; Shohat, 1989; Urian, 1997). Finally, these beliefs were extensively presented in the education system through the textbooks used in schools, through ceremonies, and in other ways (Bar-Tal, 1998a, 1998b; Podeh, 2002). Nonetheless, as the first signs of peace manifested in the late 1970s, so began the confidence in the EOC and its centrality to decrease. Additionally, alternative societal beliefs began to emerge that propagated new goals of peace making and presented a legitimized and humanized view of the rival (see the extensive reviews by Bar-Tal, 2007b; Oren, 2009).

The Present Research

We conducted three studies in order to develop a measure of individuals' adherence to the EOC, validate it, and demonstrate its utility. The first study was devoted to the selection of items for the scale, covering all of the themes that comprise the EOC, as well as testing a measurement model of the latent underlying structure of the scale. We predicted that items reflecting the different themes would load on latent factors representing their respective themes, and that these factors, in turn, would

load on a single second-order factor reflecting a coherent underlying worldview, namely, the EOC.

The second study addressed the discriminant validity of the EOC scale by demonstrating that the measure is distinct from measures of positive Jewish identity and support for concrete policies regarding the conflict. In the third study, in order to illustrate the role played by the EOC within a broader political-psychological process, we used the scale developed in the first two studies to demonstrate how the EOC mediates the effect of conservative (right wing) ideology on concrete positions held by Israelis regarding compromises with the Palestinians. This study allowed us to demonstrate, among a national sample of Jews in Israel, the ideological functioning of the EOC, which serves as a prism through which individuals evaluate ongoing major events or major information presented throughout the protracted conflict.

Study 1: Construction of the EOC Scale

The construction of the EOC scale followed the eight steps of scale development proposed by DeVellis (2003).

Step 1: Determining the Construct to Be Measured

The first stage involves specifying the nominal definition of the measured construct. In our case, we defined adherence to the EOC as acceptance of societal beliefs pertaining to the eight belief themes that comprise the ethos, that is, justness of group goals, security, positive collective self-image, delegitimization of the opponents, ingroup victimization, patriotism, unity, and peace.

Step 2: Generating an Item Pool

The second stage involves the construction of a list of statements, from which the investigator selects those statements that will eventually be included in the measure. In keeping with the expectation that expressions of the EOC would appear in cultural products and in school textbooks, which reflect the socialization of young generations, we searched for statements reflecting the different themes of the EOC in Israeli school textbooks of geography, literature, and history, as well as in the print press and in leaders' speeches. Our search yielded a preliminary list of 136 statements referring to the different EOC themes. Specifically, 17 statements referred to the justness of the Jewish Israeli goals, 20 referred to security, 14 referred to the delegitimization of the Arabs, 12 referred to the positive image of the Jewish people, 13 referred to patriotism, 15 referred to social unity, 25 referred to the perception of the Jewish collective as victims, and 20 referred to peace. Within each theme, some of the statements reflected the contents of the EOC, whereas others contradicted the EOC and were intended to be reverse scored in the final scale.

Step 3: Expert Review of the Items[1]

Ten Jewish Israeli experts on the conflict and the society (five women and five men) were given brief instructions regarding the definition of the themes of the EOC and their contents. They were then given the list of statements and were instructed to categorize each statement into one of the themes and, using a 5-point scale, rate the degree to which the statement represents the theme (1 = *not at all*, 5 = *very much*). The judges were also given an opportunity to provide written comments regarding the wording of the items.

On the basis of the judges' ratings, we selected an interim list of 48 statements. Each of the selected statements had been categorized into the same theme by all 10 judges and received a mean rating of 4.5 or higher regarding the degree to which it represented the theme. The interim list included six statements representing each theme of the ethos, of which three reflected the contents of their respective theme and three contradicted the theme's contents. In some cases, we slightly modified the wording of the statements as per the judges' comments. Finally, the 48 items were arranged in random order, which remained fixed for all respondents.

---

[1] According to DeVellis (2003), the third step of scale development consists of determining the format of the measurement, and the fourth step involves expert review of the items. In our case, however, it seemed more appropriate to reverse the third and fourth stages.

Step 4: Determining the Format for Measurement

This stage involves determining the scale's format and the response options to be given to the respondents. Given the assumption that the different ethos themes are not independent of each other but represent a holistic worldview, we opted for a scale of equally weighted items (DeVellis, 2003), in which each item represents the underlying construct imperfectly, but the combination of items presumably creates a complete representation. Regarding response options, studies indicate that scales using five to seven options yield more reliable scores than other rating methods (Miethe, 1985). Hence, we opted for a 5-point scale ranging from 1 = *absolutely agree with the statement* to 5 = *absolutely disagree with the statement.*

Step 5 of scale development, according to DeVellis (2003), involves inclusion of validation items. In our case, Study 1 did not address the validation of the scale, as this was the main focus of Study 2 (see Study 2: Validation of the Scale).

Step 6: Administering the Items to a Development Sample

This stage enables quantitative testing of the scale's reliability and validity. Additional studies, described in following sections, provided further validation in later stages.

Participants. The sample included 387 Jewish Israeli undergraduate students (294 women, 91 men; two did not specify their gender) who agreed to participate in the study following requests from their instructors. The students were recruited at three Israeli academic institutions: Tel Aviv University ($N = 250$), Bar Ilan University ($N = 107$), and an all-female religious college located in the West Bank ($N = 30$). Their ages ranged between 18 and 54 ($M = 23.20$, $SD = 3.39$). Eighty-nine percent of the participants ($N = 343$) indicated that they were born in Israel, and the rest ($N = 44$) were born in the former Soviet Union or other European countries. Regarding level of religiosity, 70% defined themselves as "secular," 9% as "traditional," 20% as "religious," and 1% as "orthodox religious." In terms of political orientation, 53% defined themselves as dovish,

32% as hawkish, and 15% defined their orientation as "center."

Procedure. The students were approached during classes at their respective institutions and were invited to participate in a study investigating Jewish Israelis' agreement with various societal beliefs about the Israeli–Arab conflict. Those who consented were given the list of 48 statements and asked to indicate their agreement with each statement.

Steps 7 and 8: Evaluation of the Items and Optimization of Scale Length

In this step, we tested the hypothesized underlying factor structure of our measure with confirmatory factor analysis (CFA, Hu & Bentler, 1999) using AMOS 19 software. Since we hypothesized that the items in our scale reflect eight different themes, all of which reflect the higher-order construct of EOC, we specified an indirect reflective model, as suggested by Edwards and Bagozzi (2000, see also Bollen & Lennox, 1991). In this model, each scale item loaded on a latent factor representing one of the eight themes of the EOC, and these eight latent factors loaded on a second-order latent factor representing the EOC. Scores on the reverse-scored items were reversed prior to their inclusion in the model.

Each item was allowed to load on one latent factor only. However, following inspection of modification indices, we allowed some of the residuals of items loading on different themes to correlate. The model fit the data reasonably, $\chi^2(938, N = 387) = 1340.06$, $p < .001$ (NFI = .82, IFI = .94, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .03). The latent factors representing the different themes loaded highly on the second-order factor (all loadings > .60), but some of the scale items did not load highly on their respective themes. In addition, observations during data collection indicated that responding to 48 items required 10–15 min. A measure requiring this much time may be too cumbersome for some studies, especially those involving numerous additional measures. Hence, we decided to shorten the questionnaire and keep only 16 items, with two items representing each ethos theme, one of which would be consistent with the theme and the other would contradict the theme and would be reverse scored.

Our criteria for the selection of items for the abbreviated scale included the items' factor loadings, as well as their correlations with the total scale score, the distribution of scores on each item, and the fit between the contents of each item and the ethos theme that it was meant to represent. In most cases, we were able to select items with high factor loadings and item-total correlations, means close to the center of the scale (3), and reasonably large standard deviations in comparison with the scale (between 0.8–1.2) in order to ensure sufficient differentiation among individuals. However, we also considered the content of the items and asked four judges, who were highly familiar with EOC theory, to evaluate how well each item corresponded to its respective theme. On the basis of their judgments, we included four items that reflected the content of four themes well, despite not meeting the statistical selection criteria. Table 1 displays the 16 items selected for the final scale, the theme represented by each, and the statistical selection criteria.

We repeated the CFA with the 16 remaining items. The two items representing each theme loaded on a latent factor representing the respective theme, and the eight latent factors loaded on a single second-order factor representing the EOC. No item was allowed to load on more than one theme. We allowed the residuals of all reverse-scored items to correlate, as well as the residuals of all non-reverse-scored items. This model fit the data well, $\chi^2(41, N = 387) = 70.41$, $p = .003$ (NFI = .95, IFI = .98, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .04). Finally, we tested the internal reliability of the abbreviated scale, and it proved adequate ($\alpha = .83$).

Study 2: Validation of the Scale

Study 2 focused on establishing the discriminant validity of the 16-item EOC scale constructed in Study 1. The aim of the study was to demonstrate that the construct measured by this scale is distinct from similar constructs measured by different scales, despite possible relationships among the different constructs. The related constructs examined in Study 2 were adoption of a positive Jewish identity and support for concrete policies regarding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that were on the public agenda at the time of the study. These two measures were selected because they represent two constructs that can potentially overlap with the EOC.

The measure of Jewish identity was selected because we sought to demonstrate that although beliefs about positive ingroup image constitute one aspect of the EOC, our proposed concept/ scale adds substantially to the Gestalt view of the conflict. Therefore, though we expected the measure of positive Jewish identity to be related to adherence to the EOC (Brewer, 2011; Guimond, 2000), we also expected it to be independent from it empirically.

The measure of support for concrete policies was included because it could be argued that individuals' ideological beliefs can be deduced from the policies that they support and there is no need for a separate measure of ideological beliefs. However, Jost et al. (2003) suggested that political ideology involves core aspects, which are stable across contexts, as well as peripheral aspects, which vary according to the historical context and relate to issues that occupy a given society at a given time. We propose, therefore, that our measure of adherence to the EOC represents individuals' core ideological beliefs and, consequently, would be distinct from support for specific policies that are on the public agenda at a given time (see also Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Gurevich, 2010). Nevertheless, since ideological beliefs do shape individuals' support for specific policies at a given time, we predict that adherence to the EOC would be related to support for specific policies. This proposition will be further expanded in Study 3.

Participants

The sample included 249 Jewish Israeli undergraduate students (175 women, 71 men; three did not specify their gender), who agreed to participate in the study following requests from their instructors. The students were recruited at Tel Aviv University ($N = 109$), Bar Ilan University ($N = 83$), and The Academic College of Judea and Samaria ($N = 57$). Their ages ranged between 18 and 43 ($M = 23.58$, $SD = 3.05$). Eighty-four percent of the participants ($N = 209$) indicated that they were born in Israel and the rest ($N = 39$) were born elsewhere. Regarding level of religiosity, 63% defined themselves as "secular," 16% as "tradi-

Table 1

Items Selected for the Final Scale, Themes Represented, and Statistical Selection Criteria

Item	Theme	M	SD	Factor loading[a]	Corrected item-total correlation
1. The fact that an Arab population was living in the Land of Israel at the time of the Jews' return attests to the Palestinians' right to establish their homeland there as well[b]	Justness of goals	3.29	1.17	.78	.67[*]
2. We should not let the Arabs see that there are disagreements among us regarding the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict	Unity	2.75	1.16	.48	.36[*]
3. Despite Israel's desire for peace, the Arabs have repeatedly forced war	In-group victimization	3.40	1.07	.59	.50[*]
4. The exclusive right of Jews to the Land of Israel stems from its status as their historical homeland	Justness of goals	3.22	1.19	.56	.47[*]
5. One can find broad moderate segments among the Arab public that wish to end the conflict[b]	Delegitimization	3.86	0.87	.58	.54[*]
6. There are values no less important than self-sacrifice for the homeland[b]	Patriotism	4.41	0.66	.35	.23[*]
7. The intentional exercise of military force is the most efficient means for eliminating security threats to the country	Security	3.09	1.05	.58	.50[*]
8. The Jews have no fewer negative qualities than do the Arabs[b]	Positive collective self-image	3.84	1.07	.63	.54[*]
9. Without compromise there can be no peace[b]	Peace	4.18	0.97	.62	.50[*]
10. The strength of the State of Israel lies in the diversity of opinions within it[b]	Unity	2.81	1.03	.37	.07
11. The Jewish people's ability to defend themselves against the Arab states is a testimony to their incredible quality	Positive collective self-image	2.80	1.14	.56	.44[*]
12. Encouraging loyalty to the Land of Israel should be one of the education system's most important goals	Patriotism	3.70	1.05	.74	.55[*]
13. Peace will only be achieved after "the facts are set on the ground"	Peace	3.08	1.01	.37	.36[*]
14. Military force alone is not enough to truly ensure the security of the State of Israel[b]	Security	4.29	.705	.17	.17[*]
15. Untrustworthiness has always characterized the Arabs	Delegitimization	2.76	1.11	.70	.62[*]
16. The Palestinians were victims of the Israeli-Arab conflict just as the Jews were[b]	In-group victimization	3.19	1.17	.61	.49[*]

[a] The presented loadings were obtained in Confirmatory Factor Analysis of the interim list of 48 items, with each item loading on one of eight themes and all themes loading on a single second-order factor.   [b] These items were reverse scored.
[*] $p < .001$.

tional," 21% as "religious," and less than 1% as "orthodox religious." In terms of political orientation, 42% defined themselves as dovish, 42% as hawkish, and 16% defined their orientation as "center."

Procedure

The students were approached during classes at their respective institutions and asked to participate in a study investigating attitudes in Is-

raeli society. Those who consented were given a booklet containing the three scales included in the study and were asked to fill them out.

Measures

In addition to the 16-item EOC scale developed in Study 1, the participants filled out measures of positive Jewish identity and support for concrete policies regarding the Israeli–Palestin-

ian conflict that were on the public agenda at the time of the study.

Positive Jewish identity.   This scale was based on the collective self-esteem scale developed by Luthanen and Crocker (1992), which was modified and adapted to the Jewish Israeli context. The original scale contains four subscales: membership (e.g., "I am a worthy member of the social groups I belong to"), private collective self-esteem (e.g., "In general, I'm glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to"), public collective self-esteem (e.g., "Overall, my social groups are considered good by others"), and identity. In the present study, we used the first three subscales of the Luthanen and Crocker (1992) measure, each of which included four items, for a total of 12 items. We replaced such expressions as "the social groups I belong to" or "my social groups" with "the Jewish people." Half of the items represented positive collective self-esteem and half represented negative collective self-esteem and were reverse scored. We dropped the fourth subscale of the Luthanen and Crocker (1992) scale because it did not translate well to Hebrew. Instead, we incorporated four items referring to the importance of Jewish tradition and history (e.g., "We should observe the Jewish holidays because they are highly valuable to the nation"). Participants rated their agreement with each item on a 7-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*; 7 = *strongly agree*). Cronbach's alpha for the entire scale was .81.

Support for concrete policies.   The participants were asked to rate their agreement with four statements concerning desired policies in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Two of the policies were of conflictive nature (e.g., "Negotiations with the Palestinians should not be conducted as long as terror attacks are going on") and two were conciliatory (e.g., "The Palestinian Authority can be considered a partner for peace negotiations"). Participants rated their agreement with each statement on a 5-point scale (1 = *do not agree at all*; 5 = *absolutely agree*). After reverse scoring the conciliatory items, Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .86.

Results

Correlations among the measures.   The bivariate correlations among the measures and the correlations corrected for attenuation due to

unreliability are presented in Table 2. Adherence to the ethos is strongly related to support for concrete policies but only moderately related to positive Jewish identity.

Confirmatory factor analysis.   To assess whether adherence to the EOC is in fact distinct from positive Jewish identity and support for concrete policies, we conducted CFA using AMOS 19 software. Due to the large number of indicators, we created parcels (Bandalos, 2002). EOC items were parceled according to theme, and Jewish identity items according to subscale. We tested the fit of three alternative (but nested) models: (a) a single-measure model, in which the paths between all three measures were constrained to 1, indicating identical concepts; (b) a two-measure model, in which the path between EOC and policy support was constrained to 1, but not the paths between positive Jewish identity and other measures; and (c) a three-measure model, in which EOC, policy support and positive Jewish identity were distinct, but correlated, latent variables with no constrains. The fit indices revealed that all three models fit the data well (see Table 3). However, the fit of the three-measure model to the data was significantly better than the fit of other models, indicating that the three measures are distinct from one another. In the three-measure model, the standardized estimate for the correlation between the latent EOC factor and the latent factor representing support for concrete policies was .61, and the estimated correlation between EOC and positive Jewish identity was .37. The findings of the CFA demonstrate that the underlying construct representing adherence to the EOC is distinct

Table 2

Bivariate Correlations and Correlations Corrected for Unreliability Among Adherence to the Ethos of Conflict, Positive Jewish Identity, and Support for Concrete Measures Regarding the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

	1	2	3
1. Adherence to the EOC	(.86)	.35**	.74**
2. Positive Jewish identity	.29**	(.81)	.22**
3. Support for concrete policies	.64**	.19*	(.86)

Note.   Figures below the diagonal represent bivariate correlations; figures above the diagonal represent the correlations corrected for attenuation due to unreliability.
* p < .01.   ** p < .001.

Table 3
Confirmatory Factor Analyses: Fit Indices and Model Comparisons

| | | | | | | | | Model comparisons | |
| | | | Fit indices | | | | | | |
Model	N	χ^2	df	CFI	IFI	NFI	RMSEA	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf
Three-measure model	249	165.02[*]	101	.96	.96	.90	.05		
Two-measure model (EOC adherence and policy support combined)	249	178.18[*]	102	.95	.96	.89	.06		
Single-measure model (EOC adherence, policy support and Jewish identity combined)	249	206.70[*]	104	.93	.94	.88	.06		
Three-measure model versus two-measure model								13.16[*]	1
Three-measure model versus single-measure model								41.68[*]	3

Note. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; IFI = Incremental Fit Index; NFI = Normative Fit Index; RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation.
[*] $p < .001$.

from positive Jewish identity and from support for concrete policies, despite its high correlation with policy support.

Study 3: Examination of the EOC Scale Among the General Jewish Israeli Public

After constructing the EOC scale among student samples, we were able to move to the next stage of the research project, in which we tested the scale among a representative sample of Jews in Israel. Additionally, in the third study, we sought to examine the functioning of the EOC as a mediator between general conservative worldviews and judgments of specific issues related to conflict. It is assumed that various general characteristics serve as facilitators or antecedents to adherence to the ideology of EOC. More specifically, the study was designed to test the hypothesis that the EOC mediates the effect of political self-categorization (the subjective self-definition of political orientation) and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) on specific positions in regard to the compromises required in order to peacefully resolve the conflict.

Two separate, yet related, concepts were used as proxies of general conservative ideology. The first and the most obvious one is the subjective definition of political orientation (Arian, 1995; Peres, 1995; Shamir & Arian, 1999). According to the proposed framework, there is an essential difference between self-categorization of Israeli society members on the left–right (or the dovish–hawkish) dimension and the degree to which a person accepts the EOC (see Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Dgani-Hirsch, 2009). Self-categoriza-

tion indicates the political camp with which the person identifies, while the EOC measure expresses the extent to which he or she accepts certain ideological beliefs about the nature of the Israeli–Arab conflict. Although we expect to find a high correlation between these two dimensions, we also expect them to differ from one another conceptually and empirically.

The second concept we used, RWA, as developed by Altemeyer (1981, 1996, 1998), tackled a more psychological aspect of conservative worldview. It is based on the relatively old concept "authoritarian personality" that was developed by the Frankfurt school (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). In essence, it outlines a personality characteristic that advocates a conservative view of the world, including adherence to traditional values, closure to new ideas, rejection of minorities, anxious veneration of authority and convention, and vindictiveness toward subordinates and deviants.

The third study was conducted as a telephone-based survey among a nationwide representative sample of Jews in Israel on the eve of the Annapolis Conference in November 2007. In this context, the various options for resolving the conflict were especially salient and discussed in the public discourse. It should be noted that, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first examination of the EOC scale in a nationwide representative sample. Administering the scale to such a large representative sample may corroborate the external validity of our findings and demonstrate the utility of our measure beyond student samples.

Method

Sampling and participants. Interviews were conducted by an experienced and computerized survey institute in Israel (the Machshov Institute). The interviewers were trained in telephone survey methodology and conducted interviews in the interviewees' native language of Hebrew or Russian. At the onset of the interview, oral informed consent was obtained. Random sampling within stratified subgroups was used to obtain a representative sample of Jews living in Israel at the time of the survey. A total of 501 interviews were completed and analyzed, and the overall response rate was 44%.

Despite minor oversampling of highly educated interviewees, the sample represented the distribution in the Israeli population of sex, age, place of residence, and voting behavior (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007). It consisted of 248 men (49.5%) and 253 women (50.5%). Almost half (46.3%) of the respondents defined themselves as moderately or strongly rightist, 23.2% said they were centrist, and 18.4%, left wing; 12.1% refused to answer. In terms of education, 7.6% did not complete high school, 31.1% possessed high school education, 16.2% had some post-high-school education, 10% were students, and 35.1% declared they had a university or college degree.

Measures. The participants filled out the 16-item EOC scale developed in Studies 1 and 2. Items were anchored at 1 (*strongly disagree*) and 6 (*strongly agree*),[2] and the scale yielded a satisfactory internal consistency of $\alpha = .78$. In addition, participants also filled out measures of RWA, sociopolitical information, and concrete positions on compromises related to the talks to be conducted at the Annapolis summit.

Sociopolitical background variables. Self-evaluation of income, compared with the average in Israel (1 = *much below average* to 5 = *much above average*), educational attainment (1 = *elementary*, 2 = *high school*, 3 = *post-high-school* [non university/college], 4 = *university/college student*, 5 = *university/college degree*), self-definition of political orientation (1 = *extreme left/dovish*, to 5 = *extreme right/hawkish*), gender (1 = *man*, 2 = *woman*). and self-definition regarding level of religiosity (1 = *secular*, 2 = *traditional*, 3 = *religious*, 4 = *very religious*).

Authoritarianism was assessed using a 3-item abbreviated version of the original RWA scale of Altemeyer (1996; sample item: "*Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children can learn*"). The shorter version of the scale was used mainly due to space limitations typical of a complicated nationwide survey (for examples of prior use of the scale's abbreviated version, see Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Items were anchored at 1 (*strongly disagree*) and 6 (*strongly agree*). High scores represented greater adherence to the RWA principles. The scale yielded an internal consistency of $\alpha = .57$.

Support for compromises. The participants were asked to rate (on a Likert scale in which 1 = *strongly oppose* to 6 = *strongly support*) their agreement with three issues that were about to be discussed during the forthcoming Annapolis summit. Following Maoz and McCauley (2005), the items dealt with the three most central issues on the agenda of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: the territorial issue ("Support for Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 borders and evacuation of most settlements"), the issue of Jerusalem ("Support for declaring the Arab neighborhoods and villages in Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state"), and the refugee issue ("Israel will accept partial responsibility for the refugee issue and will allow the migration of 30,000 refugees into its borders"). Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .63.

Results

Descriptive statistics and correlations among variables. Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables and the correlations among them. As can be seen, levels of adherence to the EOC among Israeli Jews were above the midpoint (M = 3.76, *SD* = .77). As hypothesized, adherence to the EOC was positively correlated with RWA, rightist political orientation, low levels of education, and high religious convictions. Interestingly, the correlation between the EOC scale and the political orientation scale was positive but only

---

[2] The change from a 5-point scale in Studies 1 and 2 to a 6-point scale in Study 3 is due to the constraints embedded within the use of a large-scale nationwide telephone survey in which other investigators with a variety of research goals were involved.

Table 4
Means (and Standard Deviations) of Study 3 Variables and Correlations Among Them

Variable	M (SD)	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. EOC	3.76 (.77)							
2. RWA	3.86 (1.27)	.48**						
3. Political position	4.01 (2.00)	.41**	.18**					
4. Religiosity	4.07 (1.41)	.32**	.28**	.34**				
5. Income	3.87 (1.84)	−.07	−.10*	−.08	−.19**			
6. Education	4.35 (1.50)	−.17*	−.26**	−.10*	−.12*	.13*		
7. Gender	1.5 (.50)	−.07	−.01	.00	.13*	−.14**	.00	
8. Compromises	2.36 (1.26)	−.59**	−.21**	−.35**	−.33**	−.01	.02	.03

* $p < .05$.   ** $p < .001$.

medium. In addition, the EOC scale was highly and negatively correlated with support for making concrete compromises for peace, but even this high correlation did not exceed the accepted level for multicolinearity (Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986).

Confirmatory factor analysis. To confirm the discriminant validity of the scale, as shown in Study 2, we conducted CFA using the same procedure that was used in Study 2. Again, due to the large number of indicators the EOC items were parceled according to their themes to create eight parcels. We tested the fit of three alternative (but nested) models: (1) a single-measure model, in which the paths between EOC, RWA and support for compromises were constrained to 1 indicating identical concepts; (2) a two-measure model, in which only the path between EOC and support for compromises was constrained to 1; and (3) a three-measure model with no constraints. As expected, the fit indices revealed that despite the high correlations between these three variables, they represent three distinct latent factors. More specifically, the three-factor model, $\chi^2(55, N = 501) = 83.4$, $p = .01$; NFI = .95; IFI = .98; CFI = .98; RMSEA = .03, fit the data much better than the single-factor model, $\chi^2(58, N = 501) = 493.7$, $p < .001$; NFI = .68; IFI = .71; CFI = .70; RMSEA = .12, $\Delta\chi^2 = 410.3$, $\Delta df = 3$, $p < .001$. Also, although the two-factor model fit the data reasonably, $\chi^2(56, N = 501) = 120.5$, $p = .01$; NFI = .92; IFI = .95; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .05), it is not as good as the three factor model ($\Delta\chi^2 = 37.1$, $\Delta df = 2$, $p < .001$), refuting any counter claims about the unity of these three factors.

We next used a similar procedure to examine the distinctiveness of the EOC scale and the subjective assessment of political orientation because both of these variables refer to individuals' ideological worldviews. For that purpose we compared two nested models: (1) a single-measure model, in which the path between EOC and subjective definition of political position was constrained to 1 indicating identical concepts; (2) a two-measure model, in which the path between the two variables was not constrained. As we expected, the two-factor model, $\chi^2(27, N = 501) = 49.8$, $p = .005$; NFI = .95; IFI = .97; CFI = .97; RMSEA = .04, fit the data much better than the single-factor model, $\chi^2(28, N = 501) = 336.8$, $p < .001$; NFI = .63; IFI = .65; CFI = .64; RMSEA = .15; $\Delta\chi^2 = 287$, $\Delta df = 1$, $p < .001$, suggesting that each of the latent variables represents an independent theoretical construct. These findings provide further support for the results of the first two studies, according to which the different themes of the EOC represent a single underlying construct.

The General Model

To examine the general model, as described in the introduction to this article, subjective political ideology, RWA, and all sociopolitical control variables were specified as exogenous variables, adherence to the EOC was specified as a mediator, and support for concrete compromises for peace was specified as an endogenous variable. We hypothesized that most of the effect of conservative worldviews and of the sociopolitical control variables on support for concrete compromises would be mediated by adherence to the EOC (see Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). The large number of parameters led to path modeling, with indices as indicators, ex-

cept for the latent variable representing the EOC, which was based on the same parceling procedure as in the CFA.

The hypothesized structural model is presented in Figure 1. The measurement model, $\chi^2(86, N = 501) = 165.98$, $p = < .001$; NFI = .91; IFI = .95; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .04, and the hypothesized structural model, $\chi^2(57, N = 501) = 125.97$, $p = <.001$; NFI = .92; IFI = .95; CFI = .95; RMSEA = .04, yielded reasonable fit to the data. Very importantly, the hypothesized model explained 51% of the variance in support for compromises and 43% of the variance in adherence to the EOC. Income level and gender were included the model but were omitted from Figure 1 because they did not have significant effects on adherence to the EOC or on support the concrete compromises.[3]

As expected, adherence to the EOC was the single most important predictor of support for concrete compromises. More importantly, the effect of political orientation on support for concrete compromises was fully mediated by adherence to the EOC. In addition, RWA and level of religiosity affected support for compromises both directly and through adherence to the EOC implying partial mediations. Finally, education level had only a direct effect on support for compromises, with no mediation of the EOC.

Then, we used the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapping technique, with 5,000 iterations, to determine whether the indirect effect of each of the exogenous variables on support for compromises via EOC was significantly different than zero. Indeed, the indirect effect of RWA was estimated to lie between $-.35$ and $-.21$ with 95% confidence; the indirect effect of political ideology was estimated to lie between .08 and .16 with 95% confidence; and the indirect effect of level of religiosity was estimated to lie between .11 and .19 with 95% confidence. Because zero was not in the 95% confidence interval, all three indirect effects are significantly different from zero at $p < .05$ (two-tailed).

Discussion

The present studies suggest that while EOC is a theoretical concept, it can be operationalized and used in empirical research. Concepts are evaluated not only on the basis of their theoretical contribution but also by the possibility of making them measurable and then using them in studies that try to tap certain realities. This contribution allows not only validation of the conceptual framework or assessment of levels of societal involvement in a conflict, but it also enables testing of series of hypotheses that can be formulated with this concept.

The results of the first study showed that the eight themes of beliefs that comprise the EOC load on a single factor, suggesting that the different themes constitute a coherent and Gestalt view of the conflict conditions. Each of the themes is unique in content and, at the same time, adds to the holistic orientation so that the different belief themes complement one another and form a core societal outlook about the conflict.

All the themes serve the same function of facilitating adaptation to the conflict context and creating the psychological conditions that allow a society to live under the conditions of conflict with meaning, predictability, and resilience. They all contribute to the same orientation of fueling the ongoing intractable conflict, suggesting that the goals of the conflict are just and essential for the societal life—that the rival is vicious and out of the boundaries of normative groups, in contrast to the ingroup, which is the victim and is characterized by virtues. Therefore, the beliefs focus on the conditions needed for full mobilization of society members to not only support the conflict but also actively take part in it, willing to go as far as sacrificing their lives.

Thus, the central societal beliefs that comprise the EOC form a holistic perspective on the conflict context. This means that the EOC represents a societal view and is "similar to the concept personality as used by psychologists to describe the total characteristics of an individual or the concept climate to describe the total characteristics of an organizational environment" (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. 139). This view corresponds well to Adorno and colleagues' (Adorno et al., 1950) theory on the "structural unity" that exists between underlying psychological needs and the ideological manifestations of those needs. In

---

[3] Given that the correlations between all research variables were presented in Table 4, we omitted the correlations among exogenous variables from the figure in order to simplify the presentation.

Figure 1. Structural equation model (standardized significant, $p < .01^{**}$, coefficients are reported) for predicting support for compromises ($N = 500$).

our case, this unity exists between the needs that appear in times of intractable conflict and the EOC that satisfies them psychologically, by providing a holistic orientation toward the reality of the conflict situation.

The contents of the societal beliefs that make up the EOC in a given society refer to issues that are specific to the conflict in which that society is involved. Nevertheless, we propose that the themes that comprise the EOC are common to many societies that are involved in intractable conflicts. The instrument developed in the present research was adapted to Jewish Israeli society in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, but we believe that, with few very minor modifications, it can serve as a basis for similar measures that may be used in other societies engulfed by intractable conflict as well. In fact, only the two items referring to the justness of the Jewish goals have to be adapted to a particular case. The other 14 items simply require changes in the labels of the groups involved in the particular conflict. Indeed, a study by Gayer (2011) applied this scale to the conditions of the Palestinian society and assessed adherence to the EOC in a sample of Palestinians. She found that the contents of the EOC feed into the Palestinian identity and underlie a rejectionist view of the conflict. The contents are relatively consensual and serve as a prism to view the current situation on the ground. Gayer (2011) also found that these contents are strongly related to traditional gender role ideologies. Additionally, Medjedovic and Petrovic (2011) found that Serb individuals who adhered to the EOC supported confrontational attitudes toward Kosovo and nationalistic political parties that hold noncompromising views on the conflict with Kosovo. Furthermore, the presented conceptual framework of EOC, with its eight themes, can serve as a guiding basis for content analysis of any texts, such school textbooks (Bar-Tal, 1998b), speeches of leaders (Arviv Abromovich, 2011), or newspaper writings (Nasie & Bar-Tal, in press).

The societal beliefs of the EOC together constitute a general ideological system related to the context of conflict, which serves as a general prism through which it is evaluated and judged. In this respect, we propose that our view of EOC corresponds well to the recent conception of ideology developed by Jost and colleagues (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003, 2009; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Their work, however, refers to a general categorization of ideologies along the liberal–conservative (or left–right) continuum, which is common to many societies, regardless of social context or circumstances. Our conception of EOC, in contrast, is unique to societies living under the conditions of intrac-

table conflict. An EOC, as an ideology, describes, interprets, and explains the conflict and its related issues by making assertions and assumptions as to the human nature of the ingroup and the rival; by presenting a particular view on the harsh reality, historical events related and unrelated to the conflict, and future aspirations; by predicting possible situations; and by specifying means of attaining set goals. It addresses the most challenging problems of individual and collective life that society members encounter in their harsh reality. It reflects genuine attempts to organize the experiences and the provided information that are part of life in the context of intractable conflict, while also reflecting conscious or unconscious tendencies to rationalize the way things are or, alternatively, the beliefs concerning how they should be (e.g., Jost et al., 2003).

Accordingly, EOC functions as a system of interpretations that is widely accepted in times of conflict because it satisfies the basic human motivation to understand the world meaningfully (Burton, 1990; Jost et al., 2008; Maddi, 1971; Reykowski, 1982; Staub, 2011). This need is especially deprived in situations of intractable conflict and needs to be satisfied. EOC, as a holistic narrative, fulfills this demand—providing clear-cut, simple, and comprehensive knowledge about the conflict—and allows predictability of future situations. Furthermore, the EOC is highly functional for coping with stress created by the conditions of intractable conflict. Successful coping with stress requires making sense of, and finding order and meaning in, the stressful conditions within existing schemes and the existing worldview, or integration between the events and the existing worldview (Antonovsky, 1987; Frankl, 1963; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Kobasa, 1985). EOC provides such meaning and allows "sense making" (Sharvit, 2008). It portrays a coherent and predictable world so the society members know what is going on and what to expect, understanding the reality of the conflict in a meaningful way. It explains the reasons for the experienced stress and thus can serve as a factor that contributes to the resilience of society members, serving as a buffer to negative consequences.

The second study showed that EOC is related to positive social identity but is also distinct from it. Nonetheless, while social identity reflects the extent to which individuals identify with their society, EOC provides meaning to their social identity. Identification with the society pertains to the cognitive, emotional, and motivational aspects that indicate the evaluation, attachment, and importance of identification with the society at the individual level (Brewer, 2011; David & Bar-Tal, 2009). This element is related to the basic need to have a positive view of the ingroup, as its image impinges on personal self-esteem as well (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). We propose that social identity is not merely self-identification with the group but also necessitates content-based elements that can reflect the essence of the group. These elements present the specific sociocultural knowledge transmitted via various channels of communication and institutions that give meaning to the collective identity. The contents of this knowledge enable members of the collective to identify with their unique collective rather than with any other human collective (David & Bar-Tal, 2009). EOC constitutes one of these elements in times of intractable conflict. As the dominant societal orientation, it provides contents that give meaning to group members' social identity (Oren, Bar-Tal, & David, 2004). Our results demonstrate that, indeed, adherence to the EOC is distinct from positive identification with the group.

The third study showed that a general conservative outlook, reflected in RWA and in the subjective definition of one's ideological position, predicted adherence to the EOC as well as positions toward peaceful resolution of the conflict. The latter finding indicates that RWA, as a general conservative outlook, is an inhibiting factor to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This finding is well in line with Altemeyer's (1998) work, which suggests that RWA, as a conservative orientation, reflects a view of the world as dangerous and threatening, and therefore implies a necessity to take precautious and conservative lines of action that assure a sense of security and social order in a society (see also Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). Thus, it was not surprising to find a close relationship between RWA and EOC as worldviews that mirror a conservative orientation of adhering to traditional goals, the known situation, and mistrust of the other, which leads to the detection of threats and dangers in possible changes.

Nonetheless, the finding showing that adherence to the EOC is a determinative factor in evaluating issues related to the conflict is of special importance. In the particular case of our study, the issues were related to the compromises needed for a peaceful resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The results show that acceptance of the EOC is related to non-compromising views of these solutions. In fact, EOC mediated the effect of general conservative orientations on judgment of specific solutions proposed to end the conflict. Thus, the last study supports the notion that EOC is a unique cognitive ideological element that provides a particular outlook on the conflict (see an example in Bar-Tal, Raviv, et al., 2009). It joins other conservative constructs, such as RWA, in providing a particular worldview. But while RWA is general and provides an outlook that is generalized to various situations and issues, EOC is unique in its conservative perspective. It views the conflict in one-sided and simplistic terms that do not allow for the critical evaluation of the situation required to change it (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). This finding is consistent with the observation made by Hogg (2005), suggesting that ideologies that tend to develop under extreme uncertainty (such as intractable conflict) are conservative ideologies that resist change. We would like to propose that the EOC fulfills needs similar to those that are fulfilled by conservative ideologies (Jost et al., 2003). It may be considered a specific case of conservative ideology that is adapted to the specific circumstances of intractable conflict and to the particular needs that it engenders. Its contents reflect the well-elaborated rationale for maintaining the conflict.

The results of the present research also suggest that there is an essential difference between the self-definition of political positions on the left–right (or the dovish–hawkish) dimension and the degree to which a person adheres to the EOC. While the self-categorization indicates the political camp with which the person identifies (Arian & Shamir, 1983), the EOC expresses the extent to which he or she holds an ideology on the nature of the Israeli–Arab conflict. Self-categorization does not necessarily reflect ideological broadness and complexity, as was shown in the studies that investigated the relationship between self-categorization on the liberal–conservative dimension and adherence

to these ideologies with elaborate scales (Jost et al., 2009). This result provides additional evidence for the importance of assessing adherence to the EOC as an ideological construct.

Several limitations of the present research should be noted. First, the measure of adherence to the EOC was developed using convenience samples of students, and only then applied to an adult sample representative of the relevant population. If the entire scale development process had been based on representative adult samples, we would have been more certain that the resulting scale is appropriate for the population. However, practical concerns prevented us from using representative samples earlier in the process. As noted previously, the interim questionnaire of 48 items used in Study 1 was quite lengthy. The students filled out this questionnaire during class time, and therefore could spend as much time on it as was necessary. Adults contacted by phone are rarely willing to spend lengthy amounts of time on an interview. Attempting to contact an adult sample that would be willing to spend the time required to respond to all the items in the interim questionnaire, as well as additional measures, would likely have resulted in a low response rate and a sample not necessarily more representative than a student sample.

A second limitation has to do with the fact that the selection of 16 items from the interim list of 48 was based on both objective empirical criteria and subjective evaluations by judges. This resulted in the inclusion of items in the short version of the scale that did not perform well statistically. It may be possible to improve the statistical attributes of the scale in future studies by relying only on statistical criteria in the selection of items. Furthermore, the wording of some of the items can be made clearer in subsequent studies, which could also result in better statistical results. For example, "There are values no less important than self-sacrifice for the homeland" could be changed to "Some values are more important than self-sacrifice for the homeland," which does not use negation and therefore avoids a double negative if the respondent disagrees.

In sum, we have proposed that the EOC is part of the sociopsychological infrastructure that evolves in the context of intractable conflicts, which are prolonged and vicious. In these conflicts, the prolonged experiences of society

members lead to the development of a societal EOC that provides society members with a shared dominant orientation. The notion of ethos assumes that societal beliefs that guide the behavior of any society are not just random, but rather represent a coherent and systematic pattern of knowledge that enables an understanding of society's major concerns of present and past, as well as its future aspirations. EOC implies that the views of society members, their coordinated behavior, decisions of society's leaders, the developed societal system, and its functioning are all based on a coherent and comprehensive set of societal beliefs. It provides legitimacy to the emerged societal order and fosters integration among society members and thus serves as a crucial mechanism for organizing a collective of individuals as a society in the difficult period of intractable conflict (Bar-Tal, 2000). Eventually, it serves as a pillar to the culture of conflict by providing its main themes (Bar-Tal, 2010, in press).

It should be noted, however, that while the EOC is functional for the needs of societies involved in intractable conflicts when no signs of peace are on the horizon, it can become a barrier to conflict resolution when the possible signs of peace making do appear (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). The societal beliefs of EOC are frozen, and this freezing implies a motivation to continue to hold these beliefs as truthful and reluctance to search and process information that may refute them (Kruglanski, 2004; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This process perpetuates the conflict because it obstructs and inhibits the penetration of new information that may facilitate the development of a peace process. Nevertheless, we realize that societies involved in intractable conflict may weaken their adherence to EOC in a long process of societal change and begin to develop alternative societal beliefs that support peace making and reconciliation (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2009, in press; de Rivera, 2009; Gawerc, 2006; Long & Brecke, 2003). This lengthy discussion is beyond the scope of the present article.

In closing, we would like to suggest that EOC is a general construct that can be used in the analysis of every intractable conflict. The general themes of the EOC are universal, as they do not pertain to specific issues or disagreements that are raised in particular conditions, but instead constitute a general ideological system of societal beliefs that serve as a prism through which society members view the conflict (see, e.g., studies by Hadjipavlou, 2007, and Papadakis, Perstianis, & Welz, 2006, in Cyprus; MacDonald, 2002, in Serbia; and Slocum-Bradley, 2008, in Rwanda). Every society involved in intractable conflict must justify the conflict's goals, insist on its self-presentation in a positive light, and, as the victim of the conflict, delegitimize the rival and create the psychological conditions that will allow it to adapt to the conflict and withstand its rival. Thus, the operationalized concept allows studying various research questions such as changes in adherence to EOC as a result of major events, functions of the EOC, antecedents of its development, as well as its consequences, and so on. We therefore believe that the present study opens a new way of looking at and studying the sociopsychological repertoire that evolves in times of intractable conflict.

References

Adorno, W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality.* New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Altemeyer, B. (1981). *Right-wing authoritarianism.* Winnipeg, Canada: University of Manitoba Press.

Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other "Authoritarian" personality. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 31, pp. 47–91). New York, NY: Academic Press.

Antonovsky, A. (1987). *Unraveling the mystery of health: How people manage stress and stay well.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Arian, A. (1995). *Security threatened: Surveying Israeli opinion on peace and war.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Arian, A., & Shamir, M. (1983). The primarily political function of the left–right continuum. *Comparative Politics, 15,* 139–158.

Arviv Abromovich, R. (2011). *Societal beliefs about Israeli–Arab Palestinian conflict transmitted in national ceremonies 1948–2006* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation; in Hebrew). Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Azar, E. E. (1990). *The management of protracted social conflict.* Hampshire, England: Dartmouth Publishing.

Bagozzi, R. P., Yi, Y., & Phillips, L. W. (1991). Assessing construct validity in organizational re-

search. *Administrative Science Quarterly, 36,* 421–458.

Bandalos, D. L. (2002). The effects of item parceling on goodness-of-fit and parameter estimate bias in structural equation modeling. *Structural Equation Modeling, 9,* 78–102.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51,* 1173–1182.

Bar-Siman-Tov, Y., Lavie, E., Michael, K., & Bar-Tal, D. (2007). The Israeli–Palestinian violent confrontation: An Israeli perspective. In Y. Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.), *The Israeli–Palestinian conflict: From conflict resolution to conflict management* (pp. 69–100). Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bar-Tal, D. (1989). Delegitimization: The extreme case of stereotyping and prejudice. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski, & W. Stroebe (Eds.), *Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions* (pp. 169–182). New York, NY: Springer-Verlag.

Bar-Tal, D. (1990). Causes and consequences of delegitimization: Models of conflict and ethnocentrism. *Journal of Social Issues, 46,* 65–81.

Bar-Tal, D. (1998a). Societal beliefs in times of intractable conflict: The Israeli case. *International Journal of Conflict Management, 9,* 22–50.

Bar-Tal, D. (1998b). The rocky road towards peace: Societal beliefs functional to intractable conflict in Israeli school textbooks. *Journal of Peace Research, 35,* 723–742.

Bar-Tal, D. (2000). *Shared beliefs in a society: Social psychological analysis.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Bar-Tal, D. (2001). Why does fear override hope in societies engulfed by intractable conflict, as it does in the Israeli society? *Political Psychology, 22,* 601–627.

Bar-Tal, D. (2007a). Sociopsychological foundations of intractable conflicts. *American Behavioral Scientist, 50,* 1430–1453.

Bar-Tal, D. (2007b). *Living with the conflict: Sociopsychological analysis of the Jewish society in Israel* [in Hebrew]. Jerusalem, Israel: Carmel.

Bar-Tal, D. (2009). Reconciliation as a foundation of culture of peace. In J. de Rivera (Ed.), *Handbook on building cultures for peace* (pp. 363–377). New York, NY: Springer.

Bar-Tal, D. (2010). Culture of conflict: Evolvement, institutionalization, and consequences. In R. Schwarzer & P. A. Frensch (Eds.), *Personality, human development, and culture: International perspectives on psychological science* (Vol. 2, pp. 183–198). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Introduction: Conflicts and social psychology. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective* (pp. 1–38). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (in press). *Intractable conflicts: Psychological foundations and dynamics.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Bar-Tal, D., Chernyak-Hai, L., Schori, N., & Gundar, A. (2009). A sense of self-perceived collective victimhood in intractable conflicts. *International Red Cross Review, 91,* 229–277.

Bar-Tal, D., & Halperin, E. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to conflict resolution. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective* (pp. 217–240). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Bar-Tal, D., Halperin, E., & Oren, N. (2010). Socio-psychological barriers to peace making: The case of the Israeli Jewish society. *Social Issues and Policy Review, 4,* 63–109.

Bar-Tal, D., & Hammack, P. L. (in press). Conflict, delegitimization, and violence. In L. R. Tropp (Ed.), *Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Bar-Tal, D., & Jacobson, D. (1998). Psychological perspective on security. *Applied Psychology: An International Review, 47,* 59–71.

Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., Raviv, A., & Dgani-Hirsch, A. (2009). The influence of the ethos of conflict on the Israeli Jews' interpretation of Jewish–Palestinian encounters. *Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53,* 94–118.

Bar-Tal, D., & Staub, E. (Eds.) (1997). *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and nations.* New York, NY: Nelson-Hall.

Bar-Tal, D., & Teichman, Y. (2005). *Stereotypes and prejudice in conflict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli Jewish society.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Baumeister, R. F., & Gastings, S. (1997). Distortions of collective memory: How groups flatter and deceive themselves. In J. W. Pennebaker, D. Paez, & B. Rimé (Eds.), *Collective memory of political events: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 277–293). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Ben-Ezer, E. (1977a). War and siege in the Israeli literature (1967–1976), part 1. *Iton, 77*(1), 5–6 [in Hebrew].

Ben-Ezer, E. (1977b). War and siege in the Israeli literature (1967–1976), part 2. *Iton, 77*(3), 14–15 [in Hebrew].

Bollen, K., & Lennox, R. (1991). Conventional wisdom on measurement: A structural equation perspective. *Psychological Bulletin, 110,* 305–314.

Brewer, M. B. (2011). Identity and conflict. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 125–143). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Burton, J. W. (Ed.). (1990). *Conflict: Human needs theory.* New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

Cairns, E. (1996). *Children in political violence.* Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Cairns, E., & Roe, M. D. (Eds.). (2003). *The role of memory in ethnic conflict.* New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Caplan, N. (2009). *The Israeli–Palestine conflict: Contested history.* Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.

Central Bureau of Statistics. (2007). *Statistical abstract of Israel 2007*. Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics.

Coleman, P. T. (2003). Characteristics of protracted, intractable conflict: Towards the development of a metaframework – I. *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 9,* 1–37.

Connerton, P. (1989). *How societies remember.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

David, O., & Bar-Tal, D. (2009). A socio-psychological conception of collective identity: The case of national identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13,* 354–379.

de Jong, J. (Ed.). (2002). *Trauma, war, and violence: Public mental health in socio-cultural context.* New York, NY: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press.

de Rivera, J. (Ed.). (2009). *Handbook on building cultures for peace.* New York, NY: Springer.

DeVellis, R. F. (2003). *Scale development: Theory and applications* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Dowty, A. (2005). *Israel/Palestine.* Cambridge, England: Polity Press.

Drucker, R. (2002). *Harakiri.* Tel Aviv, Israel: Yedioth Ahronoth Books and Chemed Books [in Hebrew].

Duriez, B., Van Hiel, A., & Kossowska, M. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance in Western and Eastern Europe: The importance of the sociopolitical context and of political interest and involvement. *Political Psychology, 26,* 299–320.

Eagleton, T. (1991). *Ideology: An introduction.* London, England: Verso.

Echabe, A. E., & Castro, J. L. G. (1996). Images of immigrants: A study on the xenophobia and permeability of intergroup boundaries. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 26,* 341–352.

Edwards, J. R., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2000). On the nature and direction of relationships between constructs and measures. *Psychological Methods, 5,* 155–174.

Elizur, Y., & Yishay-Krien, N. (2009). Participation in atrocities among Israeli soldiers during the First Intifada: A qualitative analysis. *Journal of Peace Research, 46,* 251–267.

Ellemers, N., Kortekaas, P., & Ouwerkerk, J. W. (1999). Self-categorization, commitment to the group and group self-esteem as related but distinct aspects of social identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 29,* 371–389.

Enderlin, C. (2003). *Shattered dreams: The failure of the peace process in the Middle East, 1995–*2002. New York, NY: Other Press.

Feldman, S., & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived threat and authoritarianism. *Political Psychology, 18,* 741–770.

Frankl, V. E. (1963). *Man's search for meaning.* New York, NY: Washington Square Press.

Gawerc, M. I. (2006). Peace-building: Theoretical and concrete perspectives. *Peace & Change, 31,* 435–478.

Gayer, C. (2011). *Gender intractability: National identity constructions and gender in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Free University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany.

Guimond, S. (2000). Group socialization and prejudice: The social transmission of intergroup attitudes and beliefs. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 30,* 335–354.

Hadjipavlou, M. (2007). The Cyprus conflict: Root causes and implications for peacebuilding. *Journal of Peace Research, 44,* 349–365.

Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On collective memory.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Halperin, E., & Bar-Tal, D. (2011). Socio-psychological barriers to peace making: An empirical examination within the Israeli Jewish society. *Journal of Peace Research, 48,* 637–757.

Halperin, E., Sharvit, K., & Gross, J. J. (2011). Emotions and emotion regulation in conflicts. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspective* (pp. 83–103). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Haslam, N. (2006). Dehumanization: An integrative review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10,* 252–264.

Hobfoll, S. E., Spielberger, C. D., Breznitz, S., Figley, C., Folkman, S., Lepper-Green, B., . . . van der Kolk, B. (1991). War-related stress. *American Psychologist, 46,* 848–855.

Hogg, M. A. (2005). Uncertainty, social identity, and ideology. In S. R. Thye & E. J. Lawler (Eds.), *Advances in group processes* (Vol. 22, pp. 203–230). New York, NY: Elsevier.

Holt, R. R., & Silverstein, B. (1989). On the psychology of enemy images: Introduction and overview. *Journal of Social Issues, 45,* 1–11.

Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indexes in covariance structure analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. *Structural Equation Modeling, 6,* 1–55.

Janoff-Bulman, R. (1992). *Shattered assumptions: Towards a new psychology of trauma.* New York, NY: The Free Press.

Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. *American Psychologist, 61,* 651–670.

Jost, J. T., Federico, C. M., & Napier, J. L. (2009). Political ideology: Its structure, functions and elective affinities. *Annual Review of Psychology, 60,* 307–337.

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin, 129,* 339–375.

Jost, J. T., Nosek, B. A., & Gosling, S. D. (2008). Ideology: Its resurgence in social, personality, and political psychology. *Perspective on Psychological Science, 3,* 126–136.

Kobasa, S. C. (1985). Stressful life events, personality, and health: An inquiry into hardiness. In A. Monat & R. S. Lazarus (Eds.), *Stress and coping: An anthology* (pp. 174–188). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Towards a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology, 10,* 257–274.

Kriesberg, L. (1993). Intractable conflict. *Peace Review, 5,* 417–421.

Kriesberg, L. (1998). Intractable conflicts. In E. Weiner (Ed.), *The handbook of interethnic coexistence* (pp. 332–342). New York, NY: Continuum.

Kruglanski, A. W. (2004). *The psychology of closed mindedness.* New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Kruglanski, A. W., & Webster, D. M. (1996). Motivated closing of the mind: "seizing" and "freezing." *Psychological Review, 103,* 263–283.

Leyens, J. P., Rodriguez-Perez, A., Rodriguez-Torres, R., Gaunt, R., Paladino, M. P., Vaes, J., & Demoulin, S. (2001). Psychological essentialism and the differential attribution of uniquely human emotions to ingroups and outgroups. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 31,* 395–411.

Long, W. J., & Brecke, P. (2003). *War and reconciliation: Reason and emotion in conflict resolution.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Luthanen, R., & Crocker, J. (1992). A collective self-esteem scale: Self-evaluation of one's social identity. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18,* 302–318.

MacDonald, D. B. (2002). *Balkan holocausts? Serbian and Croatian victim-centred propaganda and the war in Yugoslavia.* Manchester, England: Manchester University Press.

Mack, J., E. (1990). The psychodynamics of victimization among national groups in conflict. In V. D. Volkan, D. A. Julius, & J. V. Montville (Eds.), *The psychodynamics of international relationships* (pp. 119–129). Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.

Maddi, S. R. (1971). The search for meaning. In W. J. Arnold & M. M. Page (Eds.) *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1970* (pp. 137–186). Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Maoz, I., & McCauley, C. (2005). Psychological correlates of support for compromise: A polling study of Jewish-Israeli attitudes toward solutions to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. *Political Psychology, 26,* 791–807.

Maslow, A. H. (1970). *Motivation and personality* (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Harper & Row.

Medjedovic, J., & Petrovic, B. (2011). *Personality traits, basic social attitudes and ethos of conflict as predictors of party affiliation in Serbia.* Unpublished manuscript.

Miethe, T. D. (1985). The validity and reliability of value measurements. *The Journal of Psychology, 119,* 441–453.

Milgram, N. A. (Ed.). (1986) *Stress and coping in times of war: Generalizations from the Israeli experience.* New York, NY: Brunner/Mazel.

Morris, B. (2001). *Righteous victims: A history of the Zionist–Arab conflict 1881–2001.* New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Mummendey, A., Klink, A., & Brown, R. (2001). Nationalism and patriotism: National identification and outgroup rejection. *British Journal of Social Psychology, 40,* 159–172.

Nasie, M., & Bar-Tal, D. (in press). Sociopsychological infrastructure of intractable conflict through the lens of Palestinians: Analysis of children and youth's writings in the Palestinian newspapers (1996–2007). *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology.*

Opotow, S. (1990). Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. *Journal of Social Issues, 46,* 1–20.

Opotow, S. (in press). Moral exclusion and moral inclusion: Intergroup conflict, justice, and peace. In L. R. Tropp (Ed.), *Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Oren, N. (2005). *The Israeli ethos of the Arab–Israeli conflict 1967–2000: The effects of major events* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation; in Hebrew). Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Oren, N. (2009). *The Israeli ethos of conflict 1967–2005.* Working Paper 27. Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. [see http://scar.gmu.edu/wp_27_oren.pdf]

Oren, N., Bar-Tal, D., & David, O. (2004). Conflict, identity, and ethos; The Israeli–Palestinian case. In Y.-T., Lee, C. R. McCauley, F. M. Moghaddam, & S. Worchel (Eds.), *Psychology of ethnic and cultural conflict* (pp. 133–154). Westport, CT: Praeger.

Paez, D. R., & Liu, J., H.-F. (2011). Collective memory of conflicts. In D. Bar-Tal (Ed.), *Intergroup conflicts and their resolution: Social psychological perspectives* (pp. 105–124). New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Papadakis, Y., Perstianis, N., & Welz, G. (Eds.). (2006). *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, history, and an island in conflict.* Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Peres, Y. (1995). Religious adherence and political attitudes. In S. Deshen, C. Liebman, & M. Shokeid (Eds.), *Israeli Judaism* (pp. 87–106). London, England: Transaction Publishers.

Podeh, E. (2002*). The Arab–Israeli conflict in Israeli history textbooks, 1948–2000*. Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey.

Preacher, K. J., & Hayes, A. F. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. *Behavior Research Methods, 40,* 879–891.

Reykowski, J. (1982). Social motivation. *Annual Review of Psychology, 33,* 123–154.

Rieber, R. W. (Ed.). (1991). *The psychology of war and peace: The image of the enemy.* New York, NY: Plenum Press.

Robben, A., & Suarez, O. M. M. (Eds.). (2000). *Cultures under siege: Collective violence and trauma.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S., Halevy, N., & Eidelson, R. (2008). Toward a unifying model of identification with groups: Integrating theoretical perspectives. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 12,* 280–306.

Rouhana, N., & Bar-Tal, D. (1998). Psychological dynamics of intractable conflicts: The Israeli–Palestinian case. *American Psychologist, 53,* 761–770.

Sande, G. N., Goethals, G. R., Ferrari, L., & Worth, L. T. (1989). Value- guided attributions: Maintaining the moral self-image and the diabolical enemy-image. *Journal of Social Issues, 45,* 91–118.

Schori, N., Klar, Y., & Roccas, S. (2011). *Perpetual victim or future victimizer: Possible outcomes of group trauma.* Manuscript submitted for publication.

Shamir, M., & Arian, A. (1999). Collective identity and electoral competition in Israel. *American Political Science Review, 93,* 265–277.

Sharvit, K. (2008). *Activation of the ethos of conflict while coping with stress resulting from intractable conflict* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.

Sharvit, K., Bar-Tal, D., Raviv, A., Raviv, A., & Gurevich, R. (2010). Ideological orientation and social context as moderators of the effect of terrorism: The case of Israeli-Jewish public opinion regarding peace. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 40,* 105–121.

Shils, E. (1968). Ideology: The concept and function of ideology. In D. E. Sills (Ed.). *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (Vol. 7, pp. 66–75). New York, NY: Macmillan & Free Press.

Shohat. E. (1989). *Israeli cinema: East/west and the politics of representation.* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.

Sibley, C. G., Wilson, M. S., & Duckitt, J. (2007). Effects of dangerous and competitive worldviews on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation over a five-month period. *Political Psychology, 28,* 357–371.

Slocum-Bradley, N. R. (2008). Discursive production of conflict in Rwanda. In F. M. Moghaddam, R. Harre′, & N. Lee (Eds.). *Global conflict resolution through positioning analysis* (pp. 207–226). New York, NY: Springer.

Somerville, J. (1981). Patriotism and war. *Ethics, 91,* 568–578.

Staub, E. (2011). *Overcoming evil: Genocide, violent conflict, and terrorism.* Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Struch, N., & Schwartz, S. H. (1989). Intergroup aggression: Its predictors and distinctness from in-group bias. *Journal of Personally and Social Psychology, 56,* 364–373.

Swisher, C. E. (2004). *The truth about Camp David: The untold story about the collapse of the Middle East peace process.* New York, NY: Nation Books.

Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). An integrative theory of intergroup relations. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.

Thórisdóttir, H., & Jost, J. T. (2011). Motivated closed-mindedness mediates the effect of threat on political conservatism. *Political Psychology, 32,* 785–811.

Urian, D. (1997). *The Arab in the Israeli drama and theatre.* Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Harwood.

Vallacher, R. R., Coleman, P. T., Nowak, A., & Bui-Wrzosinska, L. (2010). Rethinking intractable conflict: The perspective of dynamical systems. *American Psychologist, 65,* 262–278.

Van Dijk, T. A. (1998). *Ideology: A multidisciplinary study.* London, England: Sage.

Volkan, V. (1997). *Blood lines: From ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism.* New York, NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.

Vollhardt, J. (in press). Collective victimization. In L. R. Tropp (Ed.), *Oxford handbook of intergroup conflict.* New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Wasserstein, B. (2003). *Israelis and Palestinians: Why do they fight? Can they stop?* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Wertsch, J. V. (2002). *Voices of collective remembering.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.